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ARTICLES
CONSISTENCY AND PREDICTABILITY: SUPREME COURT
ANTITRUST DECISIONS DURING THE 1978 TERM
Jeff Miles*
An article which discusses the Supreme Court's antitrust deci-
sions during a term is necessarily general in nature, because tem-
poral and spatial constraints do not allow in-depth treatises on each
issue raised in each case. Rather, the writing should explain each
decision, analyze the Court's reasoning, and assess the holding's
effect on future cases and antitrust enforcement in general. Perhaps,
however, the most crucial requirement is that it explain judicial
philosophies and trends that aid counsel in advising their clients.
During this term there was no "blockbuster" case which can be
pointed to as blazing a new road in antitrust or as greatly affecting
antitrust analysis or enforcement for years to come. This, though,
is not to say that decisions this term teach us nothing or result in
our not being able to glean trends. The Court decided six cases, and
each adds an increment to our antitrust jurisprudence. Most impor-
tantly, its decisions, especially when read together with those of its
last two terms, clearly evidence that two key words describe the
Court's selection of cases, its analysis and its holdings: consistency
and predictability. The Court continues to hear cases involving the
same broad issues, analyzes them in the same manner and reaches
results substantially similar to those of the immediately preceding
two terms.
Consider, for example, that the Court decided six antitrust cases
this term. Of the six, two involved substantive principles,' two in-
volved exemptions,2 and two involved procedure,' just as two years
* B.S., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1968, M.A., 1971; J.D., Wash-
ington & Lee University, 1973. Trial Attorney, Antitrust Division, United States Department
of Justice.
The opinions herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent views of the
Department of Justice.
1. See text accompanying notes 14-15 infra.
2. See text accompanying notes 21-23 infra.
3. See text accompanying notes 18-20 infra.
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ago.' The Court dealt with the state action exemption (albeit
briefly) for the fifth straight term.5 It decided cases involving who
can recover under antitrust law and involving the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, the Robinson-Patman Act, a state economic regula-
tory scheme, and a proper Sherman Act analysis,6 just as it did last
term.' As was true of the last two terms, none of its selections dealt
with issues of statutory construction.
Comparison of this term's opinions with those of the previous two
indicates that the Court's results are becoming easier to predict.
Exemptions from antitrust coverage continue to be construed nar-
rowly;' liberal ability to bring private actions is inferred;9 states are
given broad leeway to establish and operate regulatory programs
which affect competition so long as such programs are mandated by
statute;'0 esoteric theory takes a back seat to business practicali-
ties;" and short-cut labeling of certain practices is eschewed for
more detailed economic analysis.'" The Court's decisions also evi-
dence an unusual degree of reliance on its own recent decisions-a
reliance that indicates that the Court is comfortable with its analy-
sis and that the results in many future cases may be foregone con-
clusions.' 3
4. See generally Miles, Socking It to Plaintiffs: Supreme Court Antitrust Decisions in the
1976-77 Term, 12 U. RICH. L. REv. 1, 22-23 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Miles].
5. See generally Miles & Russell, Economic Competition and the Supreme Court: Deci-
sions in the 1977 Term, 13 U. RiCH. L. REv. 1, 26 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Miles &
Russell].
6. See text accompanying notes 14-19, 21-23 infra.
7. See Miles & Russell, supra note 5, at 5-15, 34-40, 46-48, 48-55.
8. Compare Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979), decided
this term, with St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531 (1978), decided last
year.
9. Compare Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 99 S. Ct. 2326 (1979), with Pfizer, Inc. v. Govern-
ment of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
10. Compare New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978) with Exxon
Corp. v. Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
11. Compare the discussion of the "meeting competition defense" of section 2(b) of the
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1970), in Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440
U.S. 69 (1979), with that in United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
12. Compare the Burger Court's recent decisions in Broadcast Mul3ic, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 440 U.S. 1 (1979); National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States,
435 U.S. 679 (1978); and Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 433 U.S. 36 (1977),
with its older decision in United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
13. A good example is McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 583 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
granted, 99 S. Ct. 2159 (1979), which involves the degree of interstate commerce necessary
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE TERM
The Court's two decisions interpreting substantive provisions of
the antitrust laws were Broadcast Music,, Inc. v. Columbia Broad-
casting System, Inc., 4 and Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
FTC. 15 In the former, the Court held that granting blanket licenses
covering copyrighted musical compositions was not a per se illegal
price-fixing agreement prohibited by section 1 of the Sherman Act. 6
In the latter, it determined that where a seller can sustain the
"meeting competition" defense of the Robinson-Patman Act, 7 the
purchaser is not guilty of knowingly inducing or receiving an illegal
price discrimination.
In its two decisions involving procedure, the Court dealt with
"standing" (in a broad sense) and the acquisition of grand jury
transcripts by private litigants. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp. 8 held that
consumers adversely affected by antitrust violations are injured in
their "business or property" within the meaning of section 4 of the
Clayton Act 9 and thus may sue for treble damages. In Douglas Oil
Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest,2 the Court reaffirmed general stan-
dards which should be applied in determining whether to grant
private litigants access to grand jury transcripts and also stated
that, where the forum of civil litigation is not that in which the
grand jury sat, the judges of both jurisdictions should jointly decide
whether access is proper.
Lastly, the Court was confronted with the limited exemption from
antitrust coverage afforded the business of insurance and the state
action exemption. In Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal
Drug Co.," it held that provider agreements between a Blue Shield
plan and participating pharmacies were not exempted from chal-
to trigger Sherman Act jurisdiction. In light of Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp.,
425 U.S. 738 (1976), and Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), it appears that
the Court will find sufficient commerce.
14. 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (discussed in Part II infra).
15. 440 U.S. 69 (1979) (discussed in Part V infra).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
18. 99 S. Ct. 2326 (1979) (discussed in Part El infra).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
20. 440 U.S. 211 (1979) (discussed in Part VI infra).
21. 440 U.S. 205 (1979) (discussed in Part IV infra).
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lenge under the McCarran-Ferguson Act." And in New Motor Vehi-
cle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co.,2 3 the Court held that California's
regulatory scheme governing establishment of retail automobile
franchises passed muster under both the fourteenth amendment
and the Sherman Act.
II. THE ROLE OF EFFICIENCY IN DETERMINING WHETHER A PRACTICE
IS PER SE ILLEGAL: Broadcast Music, Inc.
Conventional antitrust wisdom makes clear that not all agree-
ments between competitors which restrain trade are illegal per se
under the Sherman Act, 24 even when they affect price. For example,
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1976).
23. 439 U.S. 96 (1978) (discussed in Part VII infra).
24. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), prohibits "[elvery contract...
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States .... In Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1910), the Court rejected a literal reading of the statute
and held that only practices "unreasonably" restraining trade are illegal. Thus, the so-called
rule of reason was born. The nature of the analysis necessary to determine reasonableness
has been explained in several of the Court's opinions. In Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), for example, the Court said:
To determine [reasonableness] the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar
to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the
restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.
The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the
particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
Id. at 238.
The test for reasonableness was refined last term in National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Professional Engineers], where the Court
noted that the ultimate question is the degree of the adverse economic impact caused by the
restraint. Often, the Court stated, this cannot be assessed without an "elaborate study of the
industry." Id. at 692. The Court also noted last term that the analysis will focus primarily
on the purpose and effect of the restraint: "[A] civil violation can be established by proof of
either an unlawful purpose or an anticompetitive effect." United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 n.13 (1978).
Although the ultimate question is always the reasonableness of the restraint, there are
certain practices which are so clearly unreasonable on their face that "no elaborate industry
analysis is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an agreement."
Professional Engineers 435 U.S. at 692. As such, they are "in and of themselves unreasona-
ble," United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927), and thus illegal per
se. This means they are "conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal
without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused [effect] or the business
excuse for their use [purpose]." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as Northern Pacific]. In Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified
Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1977), the court explained the importance of the per
se rule to plaintiffs:
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horizontal mergers, which obviously end price competition between
the acquiring and acquired firms are tested under the rule of rea-
son.25 The rule of reason also is often used to test joint ventures or
joint selling agencies, where competitors establish a new entity,
effectively ending price competition among them.2 1
These arrangements are not automatically held illegal for the
reason that they often achieve economic efficiencies which offset
anticompetitive effects and which can be determined only after a
detailed study of the industry's characteristics. 21 Only where pre-
vious experience with, and study of, a particular practice has shown
that adverse competitive impact almost always outweighs any pro-
competitive benefits, is a practice declared illegal per se. 28 Typi-
cally, courts have applied the per se rule where a course of conduct
fits within a certain label, such as horizontal price-fixing,29 horizon-
tal customer or geographic market allocation," or certain group boy-
cotts" and tying arrangements. 2
The per se label indicates that a plaintiff need not demonstrate that the effects of the
[violation] are unreasonable. Indeed, not only is the plaintiff relieved from establish-
ing that the effects are unreasonable, but in addition, the defendant is not free to
demonstrate that the effects are reasonable or even affirmatively desirable. The com-
petitive impact of the arrangement simply is not an issue for trial.
Id. at 374-75.
The Court has explained when use of the per se rule is proper. In Northern Pacific, 356
U.S. at 5, for example, it noted that the agreement should have a "pernicious effect on
competition and. . . lack. . . any redeeming virtue. . . ."Accordingly, "the potential com-
petitive harm plus the administrative cost of determining in what particular situations the
practice may be harmful must far outweigh the benefits that may result." United States v.
Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969) (Marshall, Harlan & Stewart, JJ., dissenting). See
also Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as GTE. The practice must be "manifestly anticompetitive" with a "demonstrable
[adverse] economic effect." Id. at 59. Finally, courts must have had considerable experience
with the challenged practice before the determination of almost universal anticompetitive
impact can be made. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
25. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1960);
see also Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933), "which is widely
regarded as an anomoly." F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 431 (1970).
27. See note 24 supra.
28. See generally White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), and note 24 supra.
29. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Flom, 558 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1977).
31. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
32. See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
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The Burger Court, however, has eschewed the mechanistic appli-
cation of the per se rule, as was evident in Warren Court decisions, 33
and has emphasized economic analysis before deciding what stan-
dard is proper.34 Nowhere is this more evident than in its decision
this term in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting'Sys-
tem, Inc.,35 where it held that the rule of reason should be applied
in assessing the legality of blanket licenses to use copyrighted musi-
cal compositions.
The facts of the case and the industry in which it arose are incre-
dibly complex. 8 Broadcast Music, Inc.31 and the American Society
of Composers, Authors and Publishers38 are entities which serve as
clearinghouses for their musical composer and publisher members.
Their primary functions are to obtain licenses from their members
for the members' copyrighted musical compositions and, in turn,
license users to perform the compositions, collecting fees which are
distributed to members. They also maintain a system of surveil-
lance of radio and television broadcasts to detect unauthorized use
and thus copyright infringement.39 ASCAP has some 22,000 mem-
bers and approximately three million compositions in its repertory,
while BMI has 10,000 publishing companies, 20,000 composer affili-
ates and some one million' compositions. The Court found that
"[a]lmost every domestic copyrighted composition is in the reper-
tory of either ASCAP .. .or BMI. ... 1
ASCAP relies primarily on blanket licenses in licensing composi-
tions to users. Under a blanket license, the user pays ASCAP a flat
33. Compare United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), with Continen-
tal T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
34. See generally Miles, supra note 4, at 51.
35. 441 U.S.1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as BMI].
36. The facts are set forth at length in Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. American Soc'y
of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 400 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
37. Hereinafter referred to as BMI.
38. Hereinafter referred to as ASCAP. Because most of what is said about ASCAP applies
equally to BMI, and because each court hearing this case focused primarily on ASCAP,
ASCAP's activities are discussed in the text and should be interpreted as including those of
BMI unless otherwise noted.
39. The Supreme Court noted that ASCAP was formed in 1914, "because those who per-
formed copyrighted music for profit were so numerous and widespread, and most perform-
ances so fleeting, that . . . it was impossible for the many individual copyright owners to
negotiate with and license the users and to detect unauthorized uses." BMI, 441 U.S. at 4-5.
40. Id. at 5.
[Vol. 14: 11
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fee, negotiated between it and ASCAP, for a nonexclusive license to
use all compositions in the repertory as often as it wants for a fixed
period of time. However, two antitrust consent decrees with the
government, require ASCAP (1) to obtain only non-exclusive licen-
ses from its members (thus allowing them to negotiate directly with
users if they wish), (2) to issue per program licenses (which allow
the user to use any composition in the repertory on any one pro-
gram) if the user desires, (3) to not discriminate in price between
similarly situated users, and (4) to allow a court to set a reasonable
fee for the blanket license if it and the user cannot agree on one.41
In 1969, the Columbia Broadcasting System, 2 one of ASCAP's
largest users, brought suit, alleging that the use of blanket licenses
violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 3 While the complaint
contained a litany of antitrust theories, including monopolization,
attempted monopolization, group boycott, tying and price-fixing,"
CBS's primary complaint was that, through use of blanket licenses,
"ASCAP and BMI are illegal combinations whose purpose and ef-
fect is to exact royalties from CBS for music it does not wish to
license."45 Neither damages nor relief prohibiting members from
combining with ASCAP were sought. Rather, CBS sought relief
which would require AS CAP to offer per use licenses .i. e., licenses
41. The United States sued ASCAP in 1941, charging that the blanket license restrained
trade. In a consent decree, United States v. ASCAP, [1940-43] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
56,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), ASCAP was prohibited from acquiring or asserting any exclusive
performing right on behalf of any copyright owner, and from discriminating in price. The
decree was modified in 1950. United States v. ASCAP, [1950-51] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). In addition to other requirements and prohibitions in the 1941 decree,
ASCAP was required to issue per program licenses when requested by users and required to
allow the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to set a
"reasonable fee" for blanket licenses (with ASCAP having the burden of persuasion on rea-
sonableness) if ASCAP and the user could not agree.
42. Hereinafter referred to as CBS.
43. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
44. CBS claimed that by the establishment of ASCAP, and by composers' authorizing
ASCAP to collectively license their compositions, price competition between composers had
been effectively eliminated and the prices for compositions fixed. In addition, it alleged that
through the use of a blanket license, ASCAP had "tied" the licensing for desirable music to
that of undesirable music, because to obtain the former, CBS had to pay for the latter.
Finally, it alleged that ASCAP's members, by using ASCAP as their licensing agent, had
concertedly refused to deal with CBS. CBS v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. 737, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
45. Id. Thus, the primary theory appeared to be that the blanket license constituted a
"tying" arrangement.
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which would require that payments be based on actual use).
ASCAP argued that blanket licenses were reasonable because
they are allowed under the consent decrees. CBS responded that (1)
obtaining copyrights directly from composers, given the tremendous
number of necessary transactions, would be impracticable, (2) a per
program license would still require it to pay for music it did not
want or use, and (3) a federal judge's availability to ix a reasonable
fee if the parties could not agree was immaterial to its charges.46
Aside from any anticompetitive effects which the use of a blanket
license might have, ASCAP clearly provides both its members and
users of copyrighted compositions with substantial benefits. It fur-
nishes a surveillance and enforcement mechanism against infringe-
ment, which individual members could not provide for themselves.
Moreover, its activities reduce members' transaction costs by collec-
tively licensing their works and then collecting and distributing
royalties. ASCAP's activities also reduce the transaction costs of
users. They find it unnecessary to deal with each composer individ-
ually, and, as the district court noted, the license "gives the user
unlimited flexibility in planning programs, because any music it
chooses is 'automatically' covered. . . .
In 1971, ASCAP moved for summary judgment, basing its motion
on K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp.,4" a superficially similar
46. CBS did not allege that ASCAP had violated the consent decrees.
47. 400 F. Supp. at 742.
48. 372 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968). There, the publishing
company sued a radio station operator for copyright infringement. The defendant admitted
infringement but claimed that the plaintiff had misused its copyrights by fixing prices with
ASCAP through the blanket license. The court found no antitrust violation because of the
district court's power under the consent decree to fix a reasonable price and because users
could negotiate directly with copyright owners if they wished.
The United States opposed plaintiff's petition for a writ of certiorari:
The parties stipulated that it would be virtually impossible for broadcasters and
copyright holders to arrange separate licenses and payments for each performance on
radio of a copyrighted composition. ...
The extraordinary number of users spread across the land, the ease with which
a performance may be broadcast,,the sheer volume of copyrighted compositions, the
enormous quantity of separate performances each year, the impracticability of negoti-
ating individual licenses for each composition, and the ephemeral nature of each
performance all combine to create unique market conditions for performance rights to
record music.
[Vol. 14:11
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case. The court, however, distinguished K-91 on the ground that
there the plaintiff set forth no alternative to the blanket license,
while in the instant case, CBS alleged that a per use license was
both feasible and less restrictive. 9 ASCAP's motion was denied.0
The case apparently was tried primarily on a tying arrangement
theory rather than price-fixing. According to the court, CBS' claim
was that it had to license undesirable music to obtain what it
wanted. As the court put it, "The validity of the claim turns on
whether CBS is in fact compelled to take a blanket license . . . to
secure the performance rights it needs." 5' After a long and searching
analysis, and even though the parties had stipulated that direct
negotiations with composers were impracticable, 52 it concluded that
no compulsion existed and found for ASCAP.5 3
If this market is to function at all, there must be-at least with respect to licensing
the performance of recorded music-some kind of central licensing agency by which
copyright holders may offer their works in a common pool.
Brief for the United States at 5, 10, K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp., 389 U.S. 1045
(1968) (footnote omitted).
The government concluded that its view might have been different had plaintiff posited a
less restrictive alternative to the blanket license which would have retained its benefits.
49. The court used an interesting but incorrect analysis based on the doctrine of "implied
repeal." This doctrine holds that where action otherwise violative of the antitrust laws is
necessary to allow a federal regulatory scheme to work, the antitrust laws are "implicitly
repealed" to that extent. See generally Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 422 U.S.
659 (1975); 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTrrRusT PRINCIPLES
AND THEIR APPLICATION 224d (1978). The court reasoned that the consent decrees between
the government and ASCAP acted as a federal regulatory scheme which allowed blanket
licensing. Thus, to the extent that CBS was unable to put forth a less restrictive alternative
which would still allow the market to function (as was the case in K-91), the blanket license
was legitimate. But here, CBS had put forth such a proposal and thus implied repeal was
unnecessary. Clearly, however, a consent decree negotiated between two parties cannot serve
to establish federal regulation sufficient to oust the antitrust laws, as the Second Circuit later
found. See note 58 infra.
50. CBS v. ASCAP, 337 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
51. CBS v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. 737, 745, (S.D.N.Y. 1975). CBS also based a claim of
per se illegality on the so-called "patent package licensing cases," Automatic Radio Co. v.
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950), and Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,
Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969). In Automatic Radio, the Court upheld an arrangement whereby
Hazeltine and Automatic Radio voluntarily agreed that the latter would accept a blanket
patent license from the former. In Zenith, the Court refined the doctrine by holding that a
per se violation occurred where the licensor insisted on a blanket license. In the instant case,
the court held that such insistence by ASCAP was precluded by the consent decrees. Both
the Second Circuit, see note 58 infra, and the Supreme Court minority, see BMI, 441 U.S. at
29, agreed with this result.
52. 400 F. Supp. at 751.
53. With respect to the stipulation, the court concluded that it delineated neither the
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The Second Circuit agreed that compulsion was lacking but re-
versed dismissal because the district court failed to properly exam-
ine the price-fixing aspect of the case.54 It recognized that the pric-
ing structure was tampered with any time a number of sellers sold
their products through a single agent at a single price, even though
they also could sell individually through direct negotiations. Ac-
cordingly, use of the blanket license fell within the broad definition
of price-fixing found in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.5
But, the court continued, while price-fixing normally is per se un-
reasonable and thus illegal, both CBS and the Department of Jus-
tice supported a "Per Se Rule with a Market-Functioning Excep-
tion"; that is, the per se rule applies except where, without a price-
fixing agreement, there would be no market at all.5" Admitting that
any such exception is very limited and rare, the court nevertheless
thought it necessary because the Sherman Act should not be con-
strued "to prohibit the very trade it was intended to protect.""' But
portion of the repertory for which direct negotiation was impracticable nor the extent of
impracticability. In finding that CBS was not compelled to accept a blanket license, it
emphasized that CBS had never sought an alternative until immediately prior to filing suit
in 1969, that CBS could establish a process to promote direct licensing within a reasonable
period of time, that CBS had not shown that individual composers would be disinclined to
deal with it directly, or that, with respect to compositions, composers could exercise monopoly
power. 400 F. Supp. at 779-83. In sum, the court said that there was "an astonishing lack of
evidence that CBS considered .. .even the feasibility of direct licensing . . . before com-
mencing suit." Id. at 780. The price-fixing claim was rejected on the seemingly immaterial
grounds that "CBS has failed to prove either that it purchased blanket licenses under com-
pulsion or that the price it paid was fixed. . . . [Tihe record establishes that CBS has
always negotiated the price for its licenses with ASCAP .... " Id. at 781.
54. CBS v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977). The court noted that while the district
court's finding "that there is indeed a viable alternative to the blanket license disposes of
the charge that the blanket license involves an illegal tie-in . . . it does not resolve the charge
of restraint of trade by the fixing of prices." Id. at 135.
55. 310 U.S. 150 (1940). There, the Court held that a price-fixing agreement flows from any
"combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of. . .stablizing the price," id. at
223, and that "[any combination which tampers with price structures is engaged in an
unlawful activity." Id. at 221.
56. 562 F.2d at 136. The court found support for this "market necessity" defense in the
Department of Justice's brief in K-91. See note 48 supra. Note the box which CBS, who
according to the court suggested the exception, is attempting to place the court in. If the court
upholds the district court's factual determination that alternatives to blanket licensing are
available, the exception does not apply and ASCAP has fixed prices. If, however, the court
accepts CBS's original argument that feasible alternatives are not available, then the price-
fixing may be legal but coercion is present and thus, there is an illegal tie-in.
57. 562 F.2d at 137-38.
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it rejected the defense on the facts before it because, as the district
court had found, there were feasible alternatives to the blanket
license, and thus the market could function without it. ASCAP also
argued that its product, i.e., the right to perform all compositions,
was different from that of its individual members, and thus it and
its members had not fixed prices." The court answered that the
agreement still involved horizontal concerted action affecting price
competition.
While the court found that the blanket license was illegal price-
fixing, significantly, it noted that "[t]he blanket license is not
simply a 'naked restraint' ineluctably doomed to extinction.""
Rather than condemning blanket licenses in toto, it rejected the
CBS claim that even the offering of a blanket license was improper
and suggested that the district court consider requiring ASCAP to
issue some type of per use license to networks that wished to obtain
them. 0
The Supreme Court reversed,6 1 holding that the Second Circuit
58. This argument, which later was accepted to a great extent by the Supreme Court, see
text accompanying notes 80-82 infra, was as follows:
ASCAP argues . ..that the blanket license . . . in all the copyrights . . . is so
different from the performing right in each separate copyright that the claim of trade
restraint by price-fixing is precluded.
ASCAP analogizes a blanket license to a symphony orchestra, in which the ensemble
is different from the individual musicians and which may therefore lawfully command
a price. . . higher than the price for each musician's performance. The fallacy is that
when the orchestra plays as an ensemble it represents the only product of its kind. Here
each composer, by contrast, records his own solo for separate broadcast. The musicians
in an orchestra are not competitors; the contributors of copyrights for the blanket
license in many situations are, and it is their price competition among themselves that
is affected by the blanket license.
562 F.2d at 139-40.
The court also rejected three other arguments. It affirmed the district court's decision
(albeit on different grounds) that Automatic Radio, 339 U.S. 827 and Zenith, 395 U.S. 100,
did not support CBS's position. It noted that in both cases the package patent licensor was
one entity which owned all the patents involved rather than a cooperative venture consisting
of numerous inventors. Also rejected were two arguments from K-91, supra note 48, that first,
price-fixing was precluded because the "fixer" was a district court in case of dispute, see note
41 supra, and second, that the consent decrees provided an implied repeal from antitrust
coverage. See supra note 49.
59. 562 F.2d at 140.
60. Id. The court felt that per use licensing might induce composers to engage in price
competition among themselves.
61. BMI, 441 U.S. 1.
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had improperly applied the per se rule.2 The majority began by
explaining that a per se analysis is proper only when the practice is
"plainly anticompetitive" 3 and "lacks any redeeming virtue."'"
While admitting that price-fixing by competitors on their individual
goods is generally per se unreasonable, and that the blanket license
constitutes price-fixing in the "literal sense,"" the Court cautioned
against calling a practice price-fixing and then labeling it per se
unreasonable too quickly. For example, it noted that partners liter-
ally "fix prices" on what they sell, and yet the per se rule is not
applied to their activities. Rather than mechanically labeling an
activity as price-fixing and automatically condemning it under the
per se rule, the task is to examine the activity and ascertain whether
it has those characteristics which justify per se treatment. The
Court stated that such an examination is especially important when
the particular practice is one of first impression, as was true of
blanket licenses. 6
The Court then discussed four factors which, although not dispo-
sitive, militated against quick application of the per se rule. First,
while the previously entered consent decrees did not grant any im-
munity, they did evidence that the blanket license had been closely
examined by the government and found to achieve certain benefits.
This presented "a unique indicator that the challenged practice
may have redeeming competitive virtues ... "I'
Second, the Court was impressed with the government's amicus
curiae argument, in both K-9111 and in the case before it, that some
form of central licensing authority is necessary, and thus that the
62. Justice White wrote the opinion for himself and seven others. Justice Stevens dissented
in part.
There is doubt that the Second Circuit applied the per se rule at all. It never said it did
and, indeed, considered defenses. Moreover, it had a full record from below which contained
most, if not all, information necessary to make a rule of reason determination. Finally, as
the Supreme Court itself noted, see text accompanying notes 71-72 infra, the Second Circuit's
guidelines for relief were consistent with a rule of reason result.
63. BMI, 441 U.S. 1 (quoting Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 692).
64. BMI, 441 U.S. at 8 (quoting Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 5).
65. Id.
66. See notes 49 & 58 supra.
67. BMI, 441 U.S. at 13.
68. 372 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968).
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per se rule should not be applied." Third, the Court pointed out that
when Congress enacted a new copyright scheme in 1976 it provided
for use of common agents and compulsory blanket licensing in sev-
eral instances."0
Finally, the Court felt that the Second Circuit's own guidelines
to the district court on remand 7' showed that it felt that application
of the per se rule was improper. The Court explained that if
ASCAP's issuance of a blanket license constituted per se illegal
price-fixing, any use of such a license, even in conjunction with a
per use license, would also: "[T]he per se rule does not accommo-
date itself to such flexibility .... ,,72
The Court next turned to four affirmative reasons why a per se
analysis was improper. Its first rationale is a striking cross between
the market necessity exception, discussed by the Second Circuit,73
and the implied repeal doctrine.74 It reasoned that were it not for the
copyright laws, the market (i.e., performing rights to copyrighted
music) would not even exist. Accordingly, where conduct is
"reasonably necessary to effectuate the rights that are granted [by
the copyright laws],' 75 logic dictates that such is not per se illegal,
even though the copyright laws provide no antitrust immunity.
Next, the more traditional antitrust variables of purpose and ef-
fect were examined. 7 The Court found that, rather than the blanket
69. A comparison of the government's brief, Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae,
BMI, 441 U.S. 1 [hereinafter cited as Amicus Brief] and the Court's opinion shows the stock
which the Court often gives such briefs. The Court's reasoning was almost identical to that
of the government. Like the Court, see text accompanying note 82 infra, the government did
not opine whether the blanket license could withstand a rule of reason analysis. Amicus Brief
at 11.
70. For example, compulsory blanket licenses for cable television secondary transmissions
are provided for, and an express antitrust exemption is granted for division of licensing fees
by a common agent. 17 U.S.C. §§ 111(d)(5)(A) & 116(c)(4) (1976).
71. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
72. BMI, 441 U.S. at 17.
73. See text accompanying notes 56 & 57 supra.
74. See note 49 supra.
75. BMI, 441 U.S. at 19.
76. See note 24 supra. The Court stated its task as follows:
[Ojur inquiry must focus on whether the effect and, here because it tends to show
effect . . . the purpose of the practice is to threaten the proper operation of our
predominantly free market economy-that is, whether the practice facially appears to
be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease
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license being "a 'naked restraint[] . .. with no purpose except
stifling of competition,' "-7 it achieved efficiencies through integra-
tion of functions, 78 such as the collective selling of licenses and dis-
tribution of royalties as well as the monitoring of copyright use. Any
restraint of trade was ancillary to the primary transaction (i.e.,
licensing in general), and thus a rule of reason analysis was proper.7 1
The Court also accepted ASCAP's argument (and that of the
government)" that its product includes its services in addition to
individual compositions and thus is different from the products of
its individual members: "'Here, the whole is truly greater than the
sum of its parts .... ,,8, ASCAP, indeed, sold a separate product of
its own. The Court concluded that while the district court might
ultimately decide that the blanket license, as presently used, is an
unreasonable restraint of trade, this should be done only after a full-
blown rule of reason analysis. 2
The importance of the decision is not in its specific holding, i.e.,
that the rule of reason should be used to test blanket licenses; if this
were the case, the Court simply could have affirmed the Second
Circuit's ruling because it, in substance if not form, used a rule of
reason analysis. 3 Indeed, even if such were not the case, the Court
output ... or instead one designed to "increase economic efficiency and render mar-
kets more rather than less competitive."
BMI, 441 U.S. at 19-20 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422,
441 n.16 (1978)).
77. BMI, 441 U.S. at 20 (quoting White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263
(1963)).
78. See note 24 supra.
79. See generally United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898),
aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). In BMI, 441 U.S. 1, the Court noted that "a bulk license of some
type is a necessary consequence of the integration necessary to achieve these efficiencies, and
a necessary consequence of an aggregate license is that its price must be established." Id. at
21.
80. Amicus Brief, note 69 supra, at 17-20.
81. BMI, 441 U.S. at 21-22.
82. Id. at 24.
Justice Stevens, while concurring that a per se analysis was improper, dissented and argued
that the record was sufficient for the Court to invalidate the blanket license under the rule
of reason. He noted that the market for music is dominated by blanket licenses; that ASCAP
and BMI are clearly the dominant firms; that blanket licenses are discriminatory because
the price paid is not based on use; that there is no price competition among copyrighted
compositions; and that the district court had found that per use licenses were feasible and
thus that the market could be competitive. Id. at 27-33.
83. See note 62 supra.
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could have disposed of the case in fewer words than it used. Rather,
the importance of BMI is much broader: Just as it did in
Professional Engineers"4 last term, where it used that case to explain
a fundamental principle of antitrust analysis,1 the Court used BMI
as a tool to explain another fundamental lesson-a lesson that can
be explained in just three sentences from the Court's opinion: (1)
"But easy labels do not always supply ready answers"; 81 (2)
"[l]iteralness is overly simplistic and often overbroad"; 8 and (3)
"it is necessary to characterize the challenged conduct as falling
within or without that category of behavior to which we apply the
label 'per se price fixing.' "188
The Court is warning not to take a set of facts, label them, and
place them in a static antitrust "pigeon-hole," e.g., price-fixing or
group, boycott, and then determine whether the per se rule or rule
of reason traditionally has been applied." Rather, the beneficial and
detrimental competitive effects of the conduct should be assessed
first. Only then, and only if it can be determined that procompeti-
tive effects are negligible and likely to be negligible in similar situa-
tions, should the practice be labeled per se unreasonable.
The philosophy shown by the Court in BMI is perfectly consistent
with that shown two years ago in GTE Sylvania0 where it made
clear that the legality of a practice can be determined only after a
detailed economic analysis of both procompetitive and anticompeti-
tive effects. There, in discussing vertical territorial restraints, the
Court found the possibility of significant procompetitive benefits
and, therefore, held that a rule of reason analysis was necessary.
Substance, not form, governed.
84. See note 24 supra.
85. In Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. 679, the Court went to great length in explaining
that competitive impact is the only consideration in a rule of reason analysis, when it could
have decided the case quickly by simply stating that per se analysis was proper and voiding
the practice on that ground.
86. BMI, 441 U.S. at 8.
87. Id. at 9.
88. Id.
89. For example, the definition given in Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. 150, is obviously so
broad that many procompetitive or competitively neutral arrangements will fall within the
literal definition.
90. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). See supra note 24.
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While, as even government antitrust enforcers agreed,9' applica-
tion of the per se rule in BMI would have been improper, the Court's
present and continued retreat from per se analysis"- is of some con-
cern for two reasons. First, as the Court itself has noted, the per se
rule provides businessmen and their attorneys with a much greater
degree of certainty than does the rule of reason.13 Second, attorneys
will have incentive to develop purported justifications with no merit
just to confuse matters. While courts should not be too quick to pull
the per se trigger, they also must remain alert to specious and dila-
tory justifications which do nothing but lengthen what already is
often complex litigation. It is possible that what used to be naked,
garden variety, horizontal price-fixing agreements will now, in the
briefs of defense attorneys, become "joint ventures" with substan-
tial "economies of partial integration."
III. CONSUMER ACCESS TO TREBLE DAMAGES: Reiter
Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that "[a]ny person who
shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor . . . and shall
recover threefold the damages by him sustained. . .. "I' Given the
inability of the government to detect, investigate and prosecute all
violations of the antitrust laws, the Court has long recognized the
crucial role of treble damage actions by "private attorneys gen-
eral" in recovering the ill-gotten gains of violators and in deterring
future violations." While section 4 appears to be straightforward
and broad in its coverage, the Court has been called upon to exam-
ine its parameters in three cases during the two terms preceding
that discussed here.9 7
91. See supra note 48.
92. See generally Miles & Russell, supra note 5, at 26.
93. See Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 5.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
95. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 135, 147 (1968) (Fortas,
J., concurring).
96. See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc., v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978); Illinois Brick Co.
v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477
(1977); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Interna-
tional Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 135 (1968); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964); Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 440 U.S. 955 (1979).
97. See text accompanying notes 102-09 infra.
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Cases interpreting section 4 appear to focus on two broad ques-
tions. First, who can sue for treble damages? And second, what
types of injuries will be recompensed? More specifically, the cases
have centered on defining "any person," "injured," "business or
property," and "by reason of" an antitrust violation, as those words
or phrases are used in section 4.
Last term, the Court was asked to determine whether a foreign
country is a "person" within the statute and thus able to recover
under section 4.98 Because the statute has an "expansive remedial
purpose,""9 because foreign corporations may sue,' 0 and because
prior decisions held that sovereignties are persons and may sue,' 0 '
the Court held that foreign countries also were "persons."
Two terms ago the Court decided two cases involving the concept
of "injury" as used in section 4. In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-
0-Mat, Inc., ,02 it held that an injury which would have occurred
whether or not the antitrust laws had been violated was not an
"antitrust injury" properly recompensable under section 4.103 More
significant, perhaps, was its decision in Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 104 that indirect purchasers from price-fixers are not
"injured" for section 4 ptirposes and thus cannot recoup treble dam-
ages.
98. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
99. Id. at 313.
100. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7, 12 (1976).
101. See Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942) (state is a person within meaning of § 7 of
the Sherman Act).
102. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
103. In Brunswick, the plaintiff was a competitor of several bowling centers which Bruns-
wick acquired in violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976), which pyohibits
certain anticompetitive mergers. Plaintiff claimed that, but for the mergers, the acquired
centers would have failed and gone out of business, and plaintiff would have obtained their
former customers. The Court noted that plaintiff's alleged injury would have occurred even
if the centers had been acquired in an acquisition not violative of § 7; therefore, any damages
awarded would be a windfall. It explained that "[p]laintiffs must prove antitrust injury,
which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows
from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful." 429 U.S. at 489. See generally Miles,
supra note 4, at 4-9.
104. 431 U.S. 720 (1977). An indirect purchaser is one who purchases not from the price-
fixer itself but, from some intermediary seller. The decision holds, somewhat arbitrarily many
believe, that the direct purchaser suffers the full extent of any injury and that none of this
damage is "passed-on" down the chain of distribution. See generally Miles, supra note 4, at
9-18.
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This term, the Court dealt with another area of inquiry presented
by section 4. In Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,"5 a case described as
"[tihe most significant antitrust ruling of the term,"" 8 it held that
consumers are injured in their "property" when they pay supracom-
petitive prices because of an antitrust violation, and thus they may
bring suit for treble damages.'
Surely, this result comes as no shock to anyone. Indeed, the amaz-
ing thing about Reiter is not its result or the Court's analysis; the
result was a foregone conclusion. What is amazing is that a court
could reach the opposite result, causing the Supreme Court to have
to waste its -time dealing with this case rather than one of more
importance.
105. 99 S.Ct. 2326 (1979).
106. Wall Street Journal, June 29, 1979, at 6, col. 1.
107. There appears to be a tendency to lump all questions arising under § 4 under the
heading of standing. See generally 1 P. AEEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS
OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 333 (1978). Indeed, the Court's present
interpretation of standing in general is broad, i.e., "whether the plaintiff alleges that the
challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise," and "whether the
interest sought to be protected . . . is arguably within the zone of interests [sought] to be
protected or regulated by the statute. . . ." Association of Data Processing Service Organiza-
tions, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53 (1970).
Standing for antitrust purposes, however, appears to be a narrower concept centering on
the idea of proximate cause or remoteness. See generally L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST LAw § 247,
at 772 (1977). The prevalent antitrust standing test is the "target area" test, which asks
whether plaintiff is "within that area of the economy which is endangered by a breakdown
of competitive conditions in a particular industry," Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's,
Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952), or whether the plaintiff,
if injured, was "aimed at" by the defendant. Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d
358, 362 (9th Cir. 1955).
Thus Brunswick, see text accompanying notes 102-03 supra, was not a standing case be-
cause the problem was not that plaintiff's injury was remote but that it was not an "antitrust
injury." Neither was Pfizer, see text accompanying notes 98-101, a standing case because the
issue there was whether foreign countries are "persons" as used in § 4. In Illinois Brick, see
text accompanying note 104 supra, the Court made clear that the issue was not standing:
"[T]he question of which persons have been injured . . . for purposes of § 4 is analytically
distinct from the question of which persons have sustained injuries too remote to give them
standing to sue .. " 431 U.S. at 728 n. 7.
Neither is Reiter, which involved the "business or property" concept, a standing case in
the narrow sense. It concerned the type of interest involved rather than the remoteness of the
injury or whether there was sufficient causal connection between the violation and the injury.
Thus, it is true that in a broad sense § 4 grants private parties "standing" to sue for the
treble damages. The important point is that interpretation of the statute can involve several
separate and distinct issues, notwithstanding the label each is given.
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The roots of Reiter are found in an unfortunate choice of words
used by the Court in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.,'"5 and two courts
subsequently taking those words out of context. The State of Hawaii
filed a price-fixing suit against several oil companies and requested
damages both for itself as a purchaser, and as parens patriae, to
obtain damages for injury to the state's "general economy."'," Em-
phasizing that the question before it was not whether Hawaii was
entitled to sue as parens patriae but whether injury to its general
economy was an injury to Hawaii's "business or property," the
Court held that business or property, as used in section 4, refers to
"commercial interests or enterprises.""'
This language, by itself, lends credence to the view that consum-
ers are not entitled to bring an action unless their injury is to some
business or commercial enterprise in which they are engaged. Other
language in the case, however, belies any such interpretation. For
example, the Court implied that the state would be injured in its
business or property "[w]here the injury to the State occurs in its
capacity as a consumer in the marketplace""' and noted that con-
sumers could sue for much of what the state claimed were damages
to its general economy."' Finally, in discussing section 4A,11 which
allows the United States to sue for damages, the Court noted that
108. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
109. Id. at 264.
110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 263 n.14. Indeed, if the rule were that those not engaged in a commercial
enterprise are not injured in their business or property, the Court should have dismissed that
portion of Hawaii's suit which requested damages arising from the sale of petroleum products
to the state itself.
112. The Court noted that
[a] large and ultimately indeterminable part of the injury to the "general economy,"
as it is measured by economists, is no more than a reflection of injuries to the "business
or property" of consumers, for which they may recover themselves under § 4.
[P]rivate citizens are not as powerless, however, as the State suggests.
Congress has given private citizens rights of action for. . . damages. . . .Rule 23
.. .provides for class actions that may enhance the efficacy of private actions by
permitting citizens to combine their limited resources to achieve a more powerful
litigation posture.
Id. at 264-66.
While admittedly this language is not dispositive of the issue, it appears to envision actions
by consumers, few of whom would be operating commercial enterprises.
113. 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1976).
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the provision allows suits "not for general injury to the national
economy . . . but only for those injuries suffered in its capacity as
a consumer of goods and services. 1 11 4 Therefore, to the extent that
any inference can be drawn from Hawaii about whether consumers
are injured in their business or property by antitrust violations, the
inference must be that they are.
Subsequent to Hawaii, two district courts held that a consumer,
injured in a non-commercial interest, was injured in his business or
property and thus could sue.115 In one, Theophil v. Sheller-Globe
Corp., '" the court explained that "[tihe antitrust laws were de-
signed for the ultimate benefit not of business but of the consumer,
and it would seem anomalous to read the Clayton Act to exclude an
action by the very persons sought to be protected."' 7 It relied pri-
marily on Chattanooga Foundry and Pipe Works v. City of
Atlanta,"8 where the Court had held that the City of Atlanta was
injured in its "property" when the price of pipe it purchased for its
waterworks was artificially high because of an antitrust violation.
The Court there noted that "[a] person whose property is dimin-
ished by a payment of money wrongfully induced is injured in his
property.""' 9 The court in Theophil also pointed to the result in
Pfizer, 2 0 which highlighted the broad remedial purpose of section 4,
114. 405 U.S. at 265.
115. Theophil v. Sheller-Globe Corp., 446 F. Supp. 131 (E.D. N.Y. 1978) (discussed in text
accompanying notes 116-21 infra); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 435 F. Supp. 933 (D. Minn. 1977)
(discussed in text accompanying notes 127-33 infra).
The Third Circuit reached the same result in dicta. In Braveman v. Bassett Furniture, Inc.,
552 F.2d 90 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977), the defendant argued that plaintiff
must be a competitor before it could be injured in its business or property. The court rejected
this argument, saying that "a general 'competitors only' rule simply cannot be the law, since
such a rule would bar § 4 recovery by victimized customers of a price fixing conspiracy." Id.
at 98-99. It concluded that "[tihe right of consumers to challenge price fixing conspiracies
is well established." Id. at 99 n.23.
116. 446 F. Supp. 131 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
117. Id. at 135.
118. 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
119. Id. at 396. The Court appeared to imply that "business" and "property" are separate
concepts: "[The city] was injured in its property, at least, if not in its business of furnishing
water, by being led to pay more than the worth of the pipe." Id. That the pipe was used in
the business of furnishing water, however, detracts from the decision's strength as authority
for the proposition that the non-commercial interests of consumers are property within the
meaning of section 4.
120. See text accompanying notes 98-101 supra.
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and to a footnote in Brunswick, which discussed some of the legisla-
tive history of section 4, and which implied its aim was to benefit
consumers. 2'
Three cases decided after Hawaii, all by the same judge, held that
consumers were not injured in their business or property unless the
antitrust violation adversely affected a commercial interest.2 2
Weinberg v. Federated Department Stores'2s is representative. The
court relied on legislative history which it interpreted as showing
that Congress' primary concern was that businesses gain compensa-
tion for antitrust harm done them. 24 Reliance also was placed on the
"commercial interests -or enterprises" language in Hawaii. It re-
jected an argument that business or property should be read dis-
junctively "to encompass injuries to pure business interests and also
to pure property interests," 1tr and distinguished Chattanooga by
pointing out that the city's waterworks was, indeed, a business.
Finally, it noted that Title III of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976,12 which had recently been passed, al-
121. See text accompanying notes 102-03 supra. In Brunswick, the Court noted that the
Senate had indicated that the treble damage remedy "was conceived of primarily as a remedy
for '[t]he people of the United States as individuals,' especially consumers."429 U.S. at 486
n.10 (quoting 21 CONG. REC. 1767-68 (1890) (remarks of Sen. George)). Moreover,
[wihen Congress enacted the Clayton Act in 1914, it "extend[ed] the remedy
under section 7 of the Sherman Act" to persons injured by virtue of any antitrust
violation. . . . The initial House debates concerning provisions related to private
damage actions reveal that these actions were conceived primarily as "open[ing] the
door of justice to every man, whenever he may be injured by those who violate the
antitrust laws, and giv[ing] the injured party ample damages for the wrong suffered."
Id. (citations omitted).
122. Gutierrez v. E. & J. Gallo Winery Co., 425 F. Supp. 1221 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Smith v.
Toyota Motor Sales, Inc., [1977-1] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 61,251 (N.D. Cal. 1977);
Weinberg v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 880 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
123. 426 F. Supp. 880 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
124. For example, the court quoted the remarks of Rep. Taggart:
A great many suits have been brought against trusts by the United States and many
trusts have been dissolved. Some few have been punished, but the people whose
business they destroyed have been practically without remedy. When this bill becomes
a law, the person who willfully destroys another person's business will do so at the
peril. . . . The bill is framed for the purpose of liberating business and not for the
purpose of injuring or destroying any business. Its great purpose is to protect small
business from big businesses.
51 CONG. REc. 9198 (1914) (emphasis added).
125. 426 F. Supp. at 884.
126. Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1394 (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1976)). The court's
mention of this as an alternative method of consumer recovery is interesting. Those positing
32 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
lowed state attorneys general, as parens patriae, to bring suit on
behalf of injured consumers, and thus consumers were not without
a remedy.
The district court decision in Reiter'27 came some two months
after Weinberg and rejected all its reasoning. It arose when Kath-
leen Reiter, a hearing aid purchaser, brought an antitrust class ac-
tion against five manufacturers of hearing aids for price-fixing. 12
The defendants argued that any violation did not injure Reiter in
her business or property.
In rejecting this argument, the court first explained that the Su-
preme Court, in using the phrase "commercial interests or enter-
prises" in Hawaii, meant it to encompass "the interest of consumers
who must pay more in the marketplace because of defendants' ac-
tions."129 Next, relying on Chattanooga, it said that "property" in-
cludes the plaintiff's money, and then explained that, while the
legislative history was not particularly enlightening, the Court had
read it in Brunswick'0 as suggesting that consumers are entitled to
sue.' 1 Finally, it pointed out that the legislative history of the
parens patriae provisions of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Im-
provements Act'31 indicated that Congress assumed that consumers,
in theory but not in practice, could bring their own treble damage
actions.1 33
that consumer injury is injury to business or property argued that the parens remedy is
vitiated if the opposite is true. Succinctly, their argument was that all the parens remedy
did was let the state attorneys general step into the consumers' shoes. Thus, if an injury was
not to business or property, neither the consumer nor the attorney general, acting on the
consumer's behalf, could recover. The validity of this argument is questionable. See note 140
infra.
127. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 435 F. Supp. 933 (D. Minn. 1977).
128. According to the court, Ms. Reiter
[was] not in any business related to that of defendants or their distributors and alleges
no property interest other than that of an individual who, because of defendants'
actions, was forced to part with more money to purchase a hearing aid than she would
have had to pay had they not engaged in allegedly illegal business practices. She is
the classic consumer plaintiff.
Id. at 934.
129. Id. at 936.
130. See note 121 supra.
131. 435 F. Supp. at 937.
132. See note 126 supra.
133. 435 F. Supp. at 938. The court relied primarily on a House report of a bill which later
became the law and which stated, "Under § 4 of the Clayton Act, any person, including any
consumer, who can prove he was injured by price-fixing. . . has a cause of action. In most
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The Eighth Circuit reversed. 3  First, while conceding that
"[c]ourts and commentators have been unable to agree on the
precise congressional intent,' ' M  and that "[tihe Supreme Court
has noted that the legislative history is not very instructive,' 36 the
court was able to conclude that "the legislative history indicates
. . .that the antitrust laws would benefit the small business owner
but would be of little value to the ordinary consumer. '' 3
Next, the court examined judicial precedent. It pointed to the
"commercial interests or enterprises" language of Hawaii without
mentioning other language in the case which supported consumer
entitlement to sue,"38 and distinguished Chattanooga on the ground
that "the city's claim arguably sought recovery for a business in-
jury.' '39
The court then examined the legislative history of the Hart-Scott-
Rodino parens patriae provisions and, citing a Senate report, con-
cluded incorrectly that Congress thought consumers were not per-
mitted to maintain antitrust actions.4 0 It then noted correctly that
the parens patriae statute created no new substantive liability, and
argued that, because Congress did not grant consumers the right to
sue and, indeed, commefited on the inappropriateness of consumer
instances, however, an individual lawsuit by an injured consumer is, as a practical matter,
out of the question." H.R. REP. No. 499, 94 Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWs 2575.
134. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 579 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1978).
135. Id. at 1079.
136. Id. at 1080.
137. Id. at 1081 (footnote omitted).
138. See text accompanying notes 111-14 supra.
139. 579 F.2d at 1082.
140. The court quoted S. REP. No. 803, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1976), which stated,
"Section 4C is intended to assure that consumers are not precluded from the opportunity of
proving the amount of their damage and to avoid problems with respect to manageability [of
class actions], standing, privity, target area, remoteness, and the like." (emphasis in the
original.) Id. at 1085.
This very language argues against the court's conclusion. If the business or property re-
quirement precluded consumer suits, there would be no problem of manageability. Moreover,
"standing, privity, target area, remoteness, and the like" present analytically different ques-
tions than does the business or property issue. None presents an absolute bar to consumer
suits as the court's holding on business or property does. Obviously, the quoted language
refers to practical problems encountered by a consumer in filing a large antitrust suit because
his individual stake is so low.
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class actions,' Congress' intent must have been that consumers
have no such right.
Finally, the court noted that large consumer class actions may be
anticompetitive themselves because they are often meritless, may
bankrupt small businesses, and lead to higher prices. It believed
that consumer claims are better handled by the state attorneys
general and thus concluded that section 4 requires a "commercial
or competitive injury.' '42
The Supreme Court4 3 took a common sense approach in unani-
mously reversing the Eighth Circuit. It emphasized the broad lan-
guage of section 4, especially the expansive, every day meaning of
property; held that a consumer's money is obviously property, rely-
ing on Chattanooga; said that nothing in Hawaii or section 4's legis-
lative history militated against that reading; and noted that any
anticompetitive or harassing effects of consumer actions were argu-
ments properly directed to Congress and individual courts in partic-
ular cases.
The Court began by explaining, as it has in so many recent
cases, 14 that its starting point is the language that Congress used
in the statute. After noting that little restrictive language appears
on the face of section 4, it focused on the word "property" and noted
that the dictionary definition "comprehends anything of material
value owned or possessed," including money.'45 Rejected was the
defendants' argument that "business or property" meant "business
activity or property related to one's business,""'4 because such an
141. The court cited H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in [19761 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2576-77, which is a part of the Report's section entitled "The
Consumer Has No Practical Means of Redress." The thrust of the report is not that consumer
actions are inappropriate as such, but that because of his or her small damage and the
technical requirements and expense of class actions, consumers sometimes lack incentive to
sue.
142. 579 F.2d at 1086.
143. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 99 S.Ct. 2326 (1979).
144. See, e.g., Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979); St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531 (1978); Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India,
434 U.S. 308 (1978).
145. 99 S.Ct. at 2330.




interpretation would read the disjunctive "or" out of the statute and
turn the key phrase into "business property."
The Court read Chattanooga to support its conclusion that
"property" has a significance independent from that of business.
Realizing that the decision there could have turned on the fact that
the city's waterworks operation was a business, the Court explained
that the result definitely flowed from an injury to "property," i.e.,
the city's having "to pay a higher price for the pipe than it otherwise
would have paid.'"14 7 From this, it concluded that a monetary injury
per se is a sufficient injury to property under section 4.
The Justices implicitly chided the Eighth Circuit for reading the
"commercial interests or enterprises" language of Hawaii too liter-
ally, noting that a decisions's language "is not always to be parsed
as though we were dealing with language of a statute."'' It pointed
to its approval in Hawaii of Chattanooga and its clear recognition,
evidenced by language in Hawaii mentioning consumers, that sec-
tion 4 allows consumer recovery. 4
The Court rejected the argument that the legislative history of
section 4 supported a different result. Recognizing that little con-
gressional intent could be gleaned from the history, it argued that
what relevant legislative history there was, which was set forth in
Brunswick, "I supported the proposition that Congress intended sec-
tion 4 to be a consumer remedy. 5'
Finally, the defendants' "practical considerations" arguments
were rejected. To the propositions that consumer class actions
would unduly burden crowded courts and that such suits could ruin
small businesses and increase consumer prices, the Court put the
ball in Congress' court. With respect to the crowded courts a-rgu-
ment, it noted that Congress had decided to give injured parties a
private remedy and thus it was up to Congress to provide sufficient
147. Id. at 2331.
148. Id. at 2332.
149. Id.
150. See note 121 supra.
151. The Court also recognized that in enacting the parens patriae provisions of the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Congress assumed the consumers were
injured in their "business or property" by antitrust violations. Its views, therefore, were
consistent with Congress'. 99 S.Ct. at 2333 n. 7.
1979]
36 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
judicial resources to handle the cases. With respect to the ruinous
effect on small business argument, the Court said that, while this
is an important consideration,'5 2 it is a policy matter more the busi-
ness of Congress than the Court. Moreover, it said that trial courts
should be able to prevent unmeritorious actions.'
5 3
Justice Rehnquist agreed with the Court's result and analysis but
wrote a separate opinion to emphasize his concern that many large
consumer class actions are not socially beneficial.'54 Indeed, this
concern, may have been a factor in the Court's taking the case.
Meritless suits, which themselves are anticompetitive, are a prob-
lem in antitrust enforcement,'55 and the Court appears to be signal-
ling district courts to watch carefully and dispose of them quickly,
and warning plaintiffs' attorneys that such suits will be dealt with
forcefully.
The Reiter case, unlike many other of the Court's antitrust deci-
sions during the last two terms, does not raise more questions than
it answers.'5 The result, approval of consumer suits, was made crys-
tal clear. Moreover, the holding was predicted correctly by almost
all of the antitrust community. Prior decisions, the mood of the
Court, the current emphasis on antitrust enforcement, the fact that
the consumer may be the only injured party where retailers fix
prices, the economic conditions plaguing the nation, the inherent
152. 99 S.Ct. at 2334.
153. For example, the Court stated:
District courts must be especially alert to identify frivolous claims brought to extort
nuisance settlements; they have broad power and discretion vested in them by Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with respect to matters involving the certifi-
cation and management of potentially cumbersome or frivolous class actions.
Id.
154. Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring). He noted,
I think that the Court's observation . . . that "the treble-damages remedy of § 4
took on new practical significance for consumers with the advent of Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 23" is a miracle of understatement; and in the absence of any jurisdictional limit,
there is considerable doubt in my mind whether this type of action is indeed ultimately
of primary benefit to consumers themselves, who may recover virtually no monetary
damages, as opposed to the attorneys for the class, who stand to obtain handsome
rewards for their services. Be that as it may, the problem, if there is one, is for Congress
and not for the courts.
155. See, e.g., Sims, "ACDEA: Unworkable, Potentially Damaging," Legal Times of
Wash., July 2, 1979, at 10, col. 1.
156. See generally Miles & Russell, supra note 5, at 68.
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weaknesses both in law and common sense of defendants' argu-
ments, and the positions of the two most widely read antitrust trea-
tises,' 7 all combined to leave little doubt how the case would be
decided.
IV. ANOTHER NARROWING OF THE INSURANCE EXEMPTION: Royal Drug
It is, perhaps, an understatement to say that exemptions from
antitrust coverage have not fared well recently in the Burger
Court. s8 While the state action exemption has occupied the Court's
time more than any other one issue in recent years'59 and presents
the best example of the Court's hostile attitude toward exemptions,
the partial exemption afforded the business of insurance by the
McCarren-Ferguson Act "" took a severe lump both this term and
* 157. 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PINCIPLES AND
THEIR APPuCATmON § 337b (1978); L. SULLiVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 247, at
771 n. 3 (1977).
158. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531 (1978); National
Broiler Marketing Ass'n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816 (1978); and cases cited at note 159
infra. Cf. Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977) (interpreting the solicitation
of government action ("Noerr-Pennington") exemption).
159. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976);
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
160. The McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as
the McCarran Act] in pertinent part is as follows:
Sec. 1. Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the
several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence
on the part of Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation
or taxation of such business by the several States.
Sec. 2(a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be
subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of
such businesp.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any
law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or
which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to
the business of insurance: Provided, That after June 30, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890,
as amended, known as the Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended,
known as the Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the Federal
Trade Commission Act, as amended, shall be applicable to the business of insurance
to the extent that such business is not regulated by State Law.
Sec. 3(b) Nothing contained in this Act shall render the said Sherman Act inapplica-
ble to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or
intimidation.
(emphasis added).
38 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:11
last. 6'
The McCarran Act, which is concerned not as much with provid-
ing an antitrust exemption as with assuring that state regulation
and taxation are not voided under the commerce clause,'12 was
passed in 1945, in response to the Court's decision in United States
v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association.'13 There, the govern-
ment indicted the Association, which was composed of some two
hundred fire insurance companies, and charged it with fixing prem-
ium rates and agents' commissions, and with boycotting, coercing
and intimidating non-member companies into joining it.'64 The de-
fendants, relying on the Court's 1868 decision in Paul v. Virginia'65
where the Court said that "[i]ssuing a policy of insurance is not a
transaction of commerce,"'66 argued that because insurance was not
commerce, the Sherman Act was inapplicable to their activities.
Rejecting this, the Court said, "No commercial enterprise of any
kind which conducts its activities across state lines has been held
to be wholly beyond the regulatory power of Congress under the
commerce clause. We cannot make an exception of the business of
insurance."67
161. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531 (1978).
162. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See generally Weller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act's
Antitrust Exemption for Insurance: Language, History and Policy, 1978 DUKE L.J. 587, 598-
602 [hereinafter cited as Weller].
163. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
164. More specifically, the Court summarized the government's charges as follows:
The conspirators not only fixed premium rates and agents' commissions, but employed
boycotts together with other types of coercion and intimidation to force non-member
insurance companies into the conspiracies, and to compel persons who needed insur-
ance to buy only from S.E.U.A. members on S.E.U.A. terms. Companies not members
• ..were cut off from the opportunity to reinsure their risks. . .; independent sales
agencies who defiantly represented non-S.E.U.A. companies were punished by a with-
drawal of the right to represent the members of S.E.U.A.; and persons needing insur-
ance who purchased from non-S.E.U.A. companies were threatened with boycotts and
withdrawal of all patronage.
Id. at 535-36.
165. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
166. Id. at 183.
167. 322 U.S. at 553. To understand South-Eastern Underwriters and the McCarran Act
it spawned, a more detailed examination of the case is helpful. In Paul, as well as other cases
involving whether the business of insurance was commerce, see, e.g., Northwestern Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 247 U.S. 132 (1918), the question had not been whether the antitrust
laws applied to insurance or even whether the federal government could constitutionally
regulate insurance. Rather, the question had been whether state regulation of insurance was
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Congressional reaction began before the decision was handed
* down."6 8 A first bill, which would have provided a total antitrust
constitutional under the commerce clause. As the Court stated:
In all cases in which the Court has relied upon the proposition that "the business of
insurance is not commerce," its attention was focused on the validity of state stat-
utes-the extent to which the Commerce Clause automatically deprived states of the
power to regulate the insurance business. Since Congress had at no time attempted to
control the insurance business, invalidation of the state statutes would practically have
been equivalent to granting insurance companies engaged in interstate activities a
blanket license to operate without legal restraint.
322 U.S. at 544.
The Court then found that insurance was "commerce" in the sense that it was a business
"in which persons bought and sold, bargained and contracted," id. at 539, and "interstate
commerce" because the business was nationwide in nature even though it might be "built
upon sales contracts which are local in nature." Id. at 547. In addition to finding that
insurance, therefore, could be regulated by Congress, the Court found nothing in the language
or legislative history of the Sherman Act from which to conclude that Congress intended to
provide insurance an exemption from antitrust coverage.
But the Court went to great pains to point out that Congress' power to regulate the inter-
state aspects of insurance did not preclude state regulation. Advancing classic preemption
and state action exemption doctrines, the Court said:
[T]here is a wide range of business and other activities which, though subject to
federal regulation, are so intimately related to local welfare that, in the absence of
Congressional action, they may be regulated or taxed by the states. . . .And the fact
that particular phases of an interstate business or activity have long been regulated
or taxed by states has been recognized as a strong reason why, in the continued absence
of conflicting Congressional action, the state regulatory and tax laws should be de-
clared valid.
The argument that the Sherman Act necessarily invalidates many state laws regulat-
ing insurance we regard as exaggerated. Few states go so far as to permit private
insurance companies, without state supervision, to agree upon and fix uniform insur-
ance rates. Cf. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-352. No states authorize combina-
tions of insurance companies to coerce, intimidate, and boycott competitors and con-
sumers in the manner here alleged,.
Id. at 548-49, 562.,
Several points are implicit in the Court's comments, and frankly makes one wonder
whether the McCarran Act was even necessary. First, the Court made it clear that it sup-
ported state regulation and taxation to the extent that they did not conflict with federal law.
Thus, Congress would have to legislate to oust state laws. Second, while state laws and federal
antitrust statutes might conflict, the state action exemption of Parker v. Brown would dictate
that state law prevail. Third, the McCarran Act specifically states that the antitrust laws
were happenstance. Had the primary question presented in South-Eastern Underwriters, that
is, whether insurance is commerce and thus subject to regulation by Congress, arisen in a
context other than antitrust (under the securities laws, for example), insurance would have
to rely on the state action exemption for any antitrust immunity.
168. Much of this discussion on the McCarran Act's legislative history is drawn from
Weller, supra note 162, at 592-602.
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exemption, was defeated. Then Congress considered legislation pro-
posed by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, a
group primarily concerned with South-Eastern Underwriter's effect
on the states' ability to tax and regulate insurance, and only second-
arily with the applicability of the antitrust laws.I 'r One version,
similar to the present McCarran Act except for a section listing
seven specific exempted activities, 170 was rejected for a version con-
taining the more general language found in the proviso of section
2(b). 171
Three questions arise in determining whether the McCarran Act
shields an activity from antitrust scrutiny. First, is the practice "the
business of insurance"? 7 ' If not, McCarran Act analysis ends, and
the remaining question is only whether the activity violates an anti-
trust law. Second, if the practice is the business of insurance, is it
"regulated by State Law"'' to an extent sufficient to trigger the
exemption?' And finally, even if the practice is the business of
insurance and is regulated sufficiently by state law, is it an
"agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coer-
cion, or intimidation"?'75 If so, the exemption fails.
While the Court has been called upon to interpret the McCarran
Act numerous times, 17 none of its cases until 1978 involved a
McCarran Act issue in the antitrust context. Then, in St. Paul Fire
& Marine Insurance Co. v. Barry,' the Court interpreted section
3(b)'s "boycott, coerce, or intimidate" language broadly to include
an agreement by insurance companies not to sell insurance to poli-
169. Id. at 593.
170. Id. at 594.
171. See note 160 supra.
172. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1976). See, e.g., Anderson v. Medical Service, No. 76-1438 (E.D.
Va.), aff'd, 551 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1977).
173. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1976). See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 242 F. Supp. 73
(E.D.N.C. 1965), affl'd, 361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930 (1966).
174. Under Section 2(b), the antitrust laws apply "to the extent that such business is not
regulated by State Law." While there would appear to be an obvious similarity between this
requirement and the state action exemption, courts have not required the specificity of
regulation under the McCarran Act that has been required to sustain the state action exemp-
tion. Compare Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) (state action) with McIl-
henny v. American Title Ins. Co., 418 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (McCarran Act).
175. 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1976).
176. See cases collected in Weller, supra note 162, at 587 n. 3.
177. 438 U.S. 531 (1978).
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cyholders except on certain terms. This expansive reading of section
3(b),'7 of course, narrowed the exemption. On the other hand, none
of the Court's cases until this term had focused on what constitutes
the business of insurance for antitrust exemption purposes, and
still, no case has shed light on the issue of how great a role the state
must play before the exemption is triggered.
The case which led the Court to discuss what practices constitute
the business of insurance and thus meet the first test of the McCar-
ran Act was Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co. 179
The case centered on the contracts between Group Life & Health
Insurance Co., a Blue Shield plan, and so-called "participating
pharmacists," by which Blue Shield provided its subscribers with
prescription drugs. Blue Shield entered into a pharmacy agreement
with each pharmacy that desired to participate. Each participating
pharmacy agreed to charge Blue Shield subscribers two dollars per
prescription, and Blue Shield reimbursed the pharmacy for its ac-
quisition cost of the drug. While all pharmacies were given the
,opportunity to participate, some chose not to. When a Blue Shield
subscriber used a "non-participating pharmacy," he or she had to
pay whatever price the pharmacy charged and then seek reimburse-
ment from Blue Shield, which would pay seventy-five percent of the
pharmacy's usual and customary charge minus two dollars.8 0
178. While this conduct might appear to be an obvious boycott and thus not an "expansive
reading of Section 3(b)," a substantial line of lower court cases held that only boycotts by
insurers of other insurance companies or their agents were within the meaning of Section 3(b).
See, e.g., Addrisi v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 503 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 929 (1975). In Barry, the Court rejected this narrow approach, holding instead that
boycott should be defined in terms of its broader, nonlegal definition and its definition for
Sherman Act purposes. 438 U.S. at 552.
179. 440 U.S. at'205 (1979).
180. The government's amicus curiae brief filed with the Supreme Court gave the following
examples of how reimbursement was determined:
Suppose the usual and customary retail price for a quantity of Drug X charged both
by "participating" Pharmacy A and "non-participating" Pharmacy B is $10.00, and
the wholesale price (or acquisition cost) to both is $8.00. If an insured buys Drug X
from Pharmacy A, the insured pays $2.00. Pharmacy A receives $2.00 from the insured
and $8.00 from Blue Shield, or $10.00 total. If an insured buys Drug X from Pharmacy
B, the insured pays Pharmacy B $10.00, and receives $6.00 (75 percent of the difference
between the retail price and $2.00) from Blue Shield. While Pharmacy B receives the
same as Pharmacy A, the insured must pay $4.00 for the drug and also must take steps
to obtain reimbursement.
If the pharmacy's acquisition cost for the drug is $5.00 rather than $8.00, the situa-
1979]
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Eighteen independent, non-participating pharmacies brought
suit against Blue Shield and three participating pharmacies, alleg-
ing that the pharmacy agreements violated section 1 of the Sherman
Act.' The gravamen of the complaint was that the pharmacy agree-
ments fixed the retail price of drugs which resulted in many Blue
Shield subscribers not dealing with the plaintiffs, thus constituting
a group boycott. 182 The plaintiffs argued that the two dollar
"dispensing fee" was too low to allow small, independent pharma-
cies a profit, especially because many depend on auxiliary services,
such as home delivery, to compete with the larger chains. Moreover,
they argued that since subscribers must pay more for prescriptions
at non-participating pharmacies and then complete the reimburse-
ment form rather than having the pharmacy do it, subscribers are
coerced into using participating pharmacies. 83 In short, the plain-
tiffs' complaint was that the Blue Shield program did not pay
enough. The defendants, on the other hand, argued that the phar-
macy agreements were the business of insurance, that the business
of insurance was regulated by the state, and that the pharmacy
agreements did not constitute a boycott, coercion or intimidation
within the meaning of section 3(b). 184
"Business of insurance," as used in the McCarran Act, has proved
to be a slippery concept. For example, the question in SEC v. Varia-
ble Annuity Co.,' was whether Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion regulation of variable annuities was ousted by the McCarran
Act. The defendant argued that variable annuities " were insurance
and that states regulate them as such. The Court, however, held
tion of Pharmacy B and the insured are unchanged. But now Pharmacy A will receive
only $5.00 from Blue Shield, for a total of $7.00.
Brief for the United States at 4-5 n.1, Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440
U.S. 205 (1979).
181. Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. at 207.
182. The allegations and arguments of plaintiffs are best articulated in the Fifth Circuit's
decision, Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 556 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1977).
183. Id. at 1378-79.
184. Id. at 1379.
185. 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
186. According to the Court, variable annuities differ from regular "fixed" annuities in
that, first, the investment philosophy behind them is more liberal as more equity securities
are purchased and second, the amount of benefits paid varies directly with the success of the
company's investment program. Id. at 69. Because of the latter feature, all risk is borne by
the investor rather than by the company. Id. at 71.
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that "the concept of 'insurance' involves some investment risk-
taking on the part of the company,"'8 and since a company issuing
variable annuities bore none, 8' the variable annuity contract was
not insurance.
Somewhat more light was shed on what constitutes the business
of insurance in SEC v. National Securities, Inc., I'l although ex-
pressed in vague generalities. The issue was whether the McCarran
Act precluded an action by the SEC to undo the merger of two
insurance companies because of inadequate disclosure. Pursuant to
an Arizona statute," the Arizona Director of Insurance found the
merger proper and approved it.191 Conceding that the McCarran
Act's legislative history does little to explain what Congress envi-
sioned as the business of insurance, 9 ' the Court held that the Ari-
zona statute, which protected "the interests of those who own secur-
ities in insurance companies,'19 3 was not a statute regulating the
business of insurance. Rather, it was a statute regulating securities.
Regulation of the business of insurance would include such things
as fixing rates, licensing companies and agents, and regulation per-
taining to the insurance contract or dealing with the insurer-insured
relationship. While other activities might be included, the Court
explained that the business of insurance focuses on "'the relation-
ship between the insurance company and the policyholder." '
187. Id.
188. See note 186 supra.
189. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
190. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-731 (Supp. 1969).
191. 393 U.S. at 457.
192. Id. at 459. The Court was able to glean from the legislative history that "[tihe
McCarran-Ferguson Act was an attempt to turn back the clock [to before South-Eastern
Underwriters], to assure that the activities of insurance companies in dealing with their
policyholders would remain subject to state regulation." Id. (emphasis added).
193. Id. at 458.
194. Id. at 460. Because this analysis is the crux of the Court's holding and is relied upon
so heavily by the Court in Royal Drug, (see text accompanying notes 242-43 infra). it is worth
quoting in its entirety:
The [McCarran Act] did not purport to make the States supreme in regulating all
the activities of insurance companies; its language refers not to the persons or compa-
nies who are subject to state regulation, but to laws "regulating the business of insur-
ance." Insurance companies may do many things which are subject to paramount
federal regulation; only when they are engaged in the "business of insurance" does the
statute apply. Certainly the fixing of rates is part of this business; that is what South-
Eastern Underwriters was all about. The selling and advertising of policies, FTC v.
1979]
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The issue, then, is to identify, without substantial guidance from
either Congress or the Court, those practices which are so inextrica-
bly related to the concept of insurance that they deserve an exemp-
tion. In general, and especially with regard to "provider agree-
ments," that is, agreements between the insurance company and
whatever entity provides services covered by the policy, lower courts
have interpreted the business of insurance broadly. In Travelers
Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross,'95 for example, Travelers, a for-profit
insurance company, complained that service contracts between
Blue Cross and participating hospitals violated the Sherman Act
because Blue Cross was able to pay a much lower hospital rate for
its subscribers than Travelers did for its policyholders. The court,
however, held that the contracts were the business of insurance
"[b]y reason of the interrelationship of hospital payments and
Blue Cross subscriber rates."'' 5
National Casualty Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958), and the licensing of companies and their
agents, cf. Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440 (1946), are also within the scope of
the statute. Congress was concerned with the type of state regulation that centers
around the contract of insurance, the transaction which Paul v. Virginia held was not
"commerce." The relationship between insurer and insured, the type of policy which
could be issued, its reliability, interpretation, and enforcement-these were the core
of the "business of insurance." Undoubtedly, other activities of insurance companies
relate so closely to their status as reliable insurers that they too must be placed in the
same class. But whatever the exact scope of the statutory term, it is clear where the
focus was-it was on the relationship between the insurance company and the policy-
holder. Statutes aimed at protecting or regulating this relationship, directly or indi-
rectly are laws regulating the "business of insurance."
Id. at 459-60.
195. 361 F. Supp. 774 (W.D. Pa. 1972), affl'd, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1093 (1973).
196. 361 F. Supp. at 777. The district court was swayed, at least to some extent, by the
fact that both subscriber rates and rates of payment to hospitals were heavily regulated by
the Pennsylvania Insurance Department. See also Frankford Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 417 F.
Supp. 1104 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd per curiam, 554 F.2d 1253 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
860 (1977).
An interesting contrast to Travelers was presented in Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,
493 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1974). Liberty National, which sold burial insurance, entered a contract
with its subsidiary by which the latter would furnish funerals for Liberty National's policy-
holders. In turn, the subsidiary contracted with individual funeral homes to provide the
funerals. The court held that the addition of an intermediary, here the subsidiary, might be
sufficient to negate the exemption. While such an arrangement was related to the business
of insurance, it appeared that the scheme was more akin to the "business of providing funeral
merchandise and services" and thus too remote from insurance to gain protection under the
McCarran Act. Id. at 50.
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A second instructive case is Proctor v. State Farm Automobile
Insurance Co., 197 which dealt with both a horizontal arrangement
between five insurance companies to pay auto repair shops a stan-
dard fee to repair the cars of policyholders, and vertical provider
agreements between the insurers and individual shops, which speci-
fied the rate agreed upon by the five companies. After reciting the
National Securities standards, 9 8 the court had no trouble in deter-
mining that the intra-industry, horizontal arrangement, by which
the companies agreed what they would pay the repair shops, was the
business of insurance, remarking that this clearly affected the
insurer-insured relationship.'99 More troubling, however, were the
inter-industry, vertical provider agreements because they, arguably,
were part of the business of automobile repair rather than the busi-
ness of insurance."'0 Stating that "[tihe question is ultimately one
of line-drawing, 2 0' the court emphasized language in National
Securities which explained that the nexus between the insurer and
insured need be only indirect for the conduct to constitute the busi-
ness of insurance,0 2 and held that since the provider agreements
ultimately affected the size of premiums paid by policyholders, they
were within the National Securities penumbra of the business of
insurance. 2 3
197. 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 440 U.S. 942 (1979).
198. See note 194 supra.
199. The court said:
The essence of the automobile insurance contract is the insurance company's agree-
ment, in return for a premium, to make payments to or on behalf of the policyholder
for losses arising out of the ownership, maintenance, of use of an automobile. The
determination by the insurance company of the amount to be paid in discharge of this
contractual obligation is at the heart of the relationship between insurer and insured,
and is directly connected with the reliability, interpretation, and enforcement of the
insurance contract.
561 F.2d at 267.
200. The court noted that "to the extent that these practices involve direct relationships
between the insurance company and non-policyholders, and are less closely connected to the
terms of the contract between the insurer and the insured, they are further from the core of
the business of insurance." Id. at 268.
201. Id.
202. See note 194 supra.
203. The court reasoned as follows:
[Tihe fact that a practice may affect other types of business is not dispositive of
whether it is sufficiently related to the business of insurance to come within the
McCarran Act's protection.
[Tihe alleged agreements with preferred shops and the asserted group boycott of
.1979]
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The district court in Royal Drug0 4 had little difficulty rejecting
the plaintiffs' arguments that the provider agreements exceeded the
business of insurance and that, even if Blue Shield were engaged in
the business of insurance, the pharmacy defendants were not, and
thus enjoyed no exemption. Relying on Travelers, 15 it held simply
that the provider agreements related directly to the insured-insurer
relationship because they were the method by which the insurer
discharged its obligation under the policies.2 6 Noting that the ex-
emption applies to the business of insurance rather than to insur-
ance companies, the court held that the defendant pharmacies were
also exempt because their agreements with Blue Shield were the
business of insurance.2 17
The Fifth Circuit reversed. 218 It began on an ominous note for the
defendants, repeating the oft-stated principle that exemptions from
antitrust coverage are construed narrowly.2 9 The court then ex-
plained that all agreements which strengthen the financial status of
insurance companies may benefit policyholders, but do not neces-
sarily constitute the business of insurance. Moreover, nothing in the
policy required Blue Shield "to fix prices or to produce other anti-
competitive effects in the pharmaceutical industry. '210 Such action,
noncooperative shops are connected closely enough to the contractual relationships
between [the insurers] and their policyholders, and with the reliability, interpreta-
tion, and enforcement of those contracts, to qualify as the business of insurance ...
Notwithstanding their effect on non-policyholders, the activities unquestionably grow
out of, and are tied to, the claims adjustment and settlement process ...
Of central significance in this entire context is the close relationship between the
cost of reimbursing damage claims, on the one hand, and the insurance rates charged
by appellees, on the other.
We need not decide whether the effect on insurance rates should be analyzed in
terms of [the insurers'] "status as reliable insurers" or, instead, in terms of its connec-
tion with the relationship between insurer and insured; . ..For the purposes of this
case, it is sufficient to say that the vital impact on [the insurers'] rates, found by the
District Court, provides additional support for our conclusion that the disputed prac-
tices are a part of the business of insurance.
561 F.2d at 268, 269-70 (citations omitted).
204. Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 415 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. Tex. 1976).
205. See text accompanying notes 195 & 196 supra.
206. 415 F. Supp. at 347-48.
207. Id.
208. Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 556 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1977).
209. See, e.g., National Broiler Marketing Ass'n v. United States. 436 U.S. 816 (1978).
210. 556 F.2d at 1381.
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the court held, constituted the business of providing drugs rather
than the business of insurance .2 1
Travelers was distinguished on the grounds that the court there
had simply approved both action of the Pennsylvania Insurance
Commissioner to reduce hospital costs and action by the legislature
to regulate hospital rates.212 The court did not appear to be dis-
turbed by the fact that every other court presented with the issue
had found that provider agreements were the business of insur-
ance.21 1 It explained that the conduct in quesion must be peculiar
to the business of insurance for the exemption to apply,214 emphasiz-
ing that an effect on premium rates was not sufficient. Finding that
nothing in Blue Shield's attempts to contain costs through provider
agreements was peculiar to the business of insurance, the court
denied the exemption. t 5
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1382. These factors would appear to address whether, if the activity were the
business of insurance, it was sufficiently regulated, rather than whether the activity was the
business of insurance in the first place.
213. See, e.g., Proctor v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 406 F. Supp. 27 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd,
561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 99 S.Ct. 1417 (1979); Anderson v.
Medical Service, 551 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1977); Frankford Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 417 F. Supp.
1104 (E.D.Pa. 1976), aff'd per curiam, 554 F.2d 1253 (3d Cir. 1977); Doctors Hosp. v. Blue
Cross, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973).
214. 556 F.2d at 1383.
215. Id. at 1386-87. Because it held that the provider agreements were not the business of
insurance, the court did not address whether the defendants' conduct was a boycott triggering
the section 3(b) exception. In addition, while not called upon to decide the question, dicta
indicates that the court would have found sufficient state regulation upon which to sustain
the exemption. 556 F.2d at 1385.
While not deciding whether the agreements violated section 1, the court did give some
indication how it would hold:
[O]ther cases have emphasized the favorable impact that price fixing and coercion
have had on insurance premiums and the "reliability" of the insurers. It is conceivable
that the public might benefit from price fixing arrangements as long as the parties to
the arrangement agree to keep prices below free market levels. The Congress, however,
has foreseen that the power to fix prices might not always be beneficially administered
by those parties holding the power once their competition has been put out of business.
It is quite clear that competitors can be destroyed by those whose financial resources
permit them to reduce prices until their competition is eliminated, only for the purpose
of raising prices in the long run. Whether such economic coercion is proper is not for a
court to decide. It is a matter of national policy which has been addressed by the
Congress, from which any change will originate only after appropriate investigation,
hearings and deliberation.
556 F.2d at 1386-87.
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The Supreme Court's decision indicates the difficulty of the case;
in a five to four decision, it affirmed the Fifth Circuit. 21 Stating that
"the starting point in any case involving the meaning of a statute,
is the language of the statute'itself, '217 the Court first emphasized
that the McCarran Act exempts only the business of insurance-not
insurance companies-from antitrust coverage. From this spring-
board, the Court jumped directly to determining the basic features
of insurance and, relying primarily on Variable Annuity,2 15 ex-
plained that "[tihe primary elements of an insurance contract are
the spreading and underwriting of a policyholder's risk." 219
The Court rejected Blue Shield's argument that its provider
agreements underwrite the insured's risk of needing, or being unable
to pay for, drugs. According to the Court, while the policies may
underwrite this risk, the provider agreements do not; rather, they
are simply a method of minimizing the insurer's costs. More impor-
tantly, the Court held that the fact that such agreements are a
necessary part of a prepaid prescription program does not automati-
cally mean that the agreement is the business of insurance. 22 The
majority concluded that there was no difference between provider
agreements and many other activities of insurance companies to
lower costs which clearly are not the business of insurance. The
agreements "are merely arrangements for the purchase of goods and
services by Blue Shield. '22'
Next, the Court focused on the National Securities requirement
that the questioned activity relate to the insurer-insured relation-
ship. 22 Noting that the agreements were not between the company
and a policyholder, the Court rejected Blue Shield's argument that
the agreements, while not between the insurer and insured, affected
the reliability of the insurer to the extent necessary to sustain the
216. Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979). Justice Stewart
wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Justices White, Blackmun, Rehnquist and
Stevens. Justice Brennan, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Marshall and Powell,
dissented.
217. Id. at 210.
218. Id. at 211.
219. Id. at 211-12.
220. Id. at 214 n.9.
221. Id. at 214.
222. Id. at 215-16.
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exemption. It explained that this was just another way of arguing
that the agreements affected costs. 211
The Court then turned to the McCarran Act's legislative history.
It noted that the statute was a response to South-Eastern
Underwriters;22 that Congress' primary concern was to insure the
continued validity of state regulation and taxation;225 that Congress
rejected a blanket exemption; 225 and that the legislation did not
overrule the decision in South-Eastern Underwriters that the anti-
trust laws may be applied to certain practices of insurance compa-
nies. 22 Then, on what appears to be weak ground, it concluded, first,
that Congress understood insurance to mean the spreading and un-
derwriting of risk,228 and second, that Congress, when it enacted the
McCarran Act, did not understand insurance to encompass provider
agreements. 229
The first conclusion was derived primarily from two rationales.
First, a House Report accompanying the McCarran Act stated that
"[t]he theory of insurance is the distribution of risks according to
hazard, experience, and the law of averages." 23 Second, the Court
posited that "it is very difficult to underwrite risk . . . without
intra-industry cooperation," and thus Congress was concerned pri-
marily with exempting intra-industry agreements from antitrust
challenge. 231 It concluded that because provider agreements had
nothing to do with intra-industry cooperation, but rather were inter-
industry arrangements, Congress did not intend them to be exempt.
Indeed, Congress did not even mention provider agreements in its
deliberations .232
Second, with respect to the McCarran Act's legislative history,
223. Id. at 216.
224. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). See text
accompanying notes 163-67 supra.
225. See notes 167, 169 supra.
226. See Weller, supra note 162, at 592.
227. 440 U.S. at 216.
228. Id. at 221.
229. Id. at 223 n.30.
230. Id. at 221 (quoting H. R. REP. No. 873, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1943) (emphasis
added)).
231. Id. at 221.
232. Id. at 223 n.30.
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the Court argued that, in 1945, pre-paid health care plans were not
thought to be insurance at all "and thus were not subject to state
insurance laws. '233 Rather, they were considered consumer coopera-
tives. But, the Court noted, even if such plans were the business of
insurance, that did not mean the provider agreements were.24
Lastly, the majority invoked the axiom that exemptions from
antitrust coverage must be strictly construed. 5 It thought the prin-
ciple particularly applicable because the alleged conspiracy in-
volved outside, non-insurance company entities and noted that
"[i]n analogous contexts, [it had] held that an exempt entity
forfeits antitrust exemption by acting in concert with nonexempt
parties."2 31
Four justices strongly dissented.2 37 While conceding that the
McCarran Act's legislative history presented little enlightenment on
the subject, they argued that Congress' rejection of the NAIC draft
bill, which listed a narrow range of exempt activities, evidenced an
intent that the exemption be broad.2 38 They then emphasized that
the purpose of the McCarran Act was to validate continued state
insurance regulation, and that even in 1945 the states were regulat-
233. Id. at 225-26 (citing Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939)).
234. Id. at 226 n.34; see also id. at 230 n.38.
235. Id. at 231 (citing, e.g. Abbott Labs. v. Portland Retail Druggist, Ass'n, Inc., 425 U.S.
1 (1976)).
236. Id. at 231. Apparently the majority forgot its own admonition that it is the business
of insurance rather than insurance companies which is exempt. See text accompanying note
218 supra.
While not called upon to judge whether provider agreements violate section 1 of the Sher-
man Act, a gratuitous footnote indicated that the Court was concerned with the agreements'
possible anticompetitive effect, at least where providers have a strong hand in establishing
the agreements:
Moreover, exempting provider agreements from the antitrust laws would be likely
in at least some cases to have serious anticompetitive consequences. Recent studies
have concluded that physicians and other health care providers typically dominate the
Boards of Directors of Blue Shield plans. Thus there is little incentive on the part of
Blue Shield to minimize costs, since it is in the interest of the providers to set fee
schedules at the highest possible level. This domination of Blue Shield by providers is
said to have resulted in rapid escalation of health care costs to the detriment of
consumers generally.
Id. at n.40. See generally FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, MEDICAL PARTICIPATION IN CONTROL OF
BLUE SHIELD AND CERTAIN OTHER OPEN-PANEL MEDICAL PREPAYMENT PLANS (1979).
237. 440 U.S. at 233 (Burger, C.J., and Brennan, Marshall & Powell, JJ., dissenting).
238. Id. at 234-35.
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ing pre-paid medical plans which depended heavily on provider
agreements.25
They next focused on "the proximity between the challenged
transactions and those well recognized as elements of
'insurance,' "2'40 and found the majority's focus on the spreading and
underwriting of risk too narrow. For example, the McCarran Act's
legislative history showed that agreements among insurance compa-
nies to fix rates, which do not spread risk, were intended to be
exempt. 24'
In addition, they explained that "[slome kind of provider agree-
ment becomes a necessity if a service-benefits insurer is to meet its
obligations to the insureds. '2 2 The pharmacy agreements, accord-
ing to the dissenters, were just such agreements rather than general
business arrangements to reduce costs. The provider agreements are
unique to insurance because they are the mechanism by which the
insurer fulfills its contractual obligation to the policyholder. As
such, the dissenters argued, they are an integral part of the business
of insurance. 23
Having found that some provider agreements are the business of
insurance, the dissent turned to whether the specific agreements
before them were within the exemption. This issue arose because the
plaintiffs' objection was not to provider agreements in the abstract,
but to provider agreements which fixed a set dispensing fee and
thus, according to the plaintiffs, precluded competition among
pharmacies. 24 The dissenters explained that the agreements under
239. Id. at 237-38. Unfortunately, the dissenters never quite tied these premises to the
conclusion that the provider agreements, themselves, are the business of insurance.
240. Id. at 238.
241. Id. at 244.
242. Id. at 246 (emphasis in original).
243. Id. at 249.
244. The plaintiffs explained their position as follows:
Despite [defendants'] assertion, [plaintiffs] are not challenging "direct contrac-
tual arrangements between an insurer and third parties to provide benefits owed to
the insurer's policyholders." The Fifth Circuit expressly recognized that the particular
activities challenged by [plaintiffs] are not "benefits owed to the insurer's policyhold-
ers" and are not "required by the policy of insurance." . . . [Plaintiffs] are challeng-
ing [defendants'] combination to eliminate price and other forms of competition in
the retail pharmaceutical industry.
Brief for Respondents in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3 (citations omit-
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examination, because they fix reimbursement to pharmacies, affect
the insurer's costs and therefore impact on both rate-setting and
reliability. In addition, by reducing the effect of market fluctuations
on the cost of drugs, they "reduce the unpredictable aspects of the
risks assumed. 2 45
They did concede, however, that not every provider agreement
should be exempt. Rather, "[tihe process of deciding what is and
is not the 'business of insurance' is inherently a case-by-case prob-
lem. 12 4 They noted that where the impetus for an anticompetitive
scheme comes from the providers, or where an opportunity to partic-
ipate in the program is not given all providers, the exemption might
fail. 247
Neither the majority nor the dissenting opinion is particularly
satisfying from an analytical standpoint. In addition, neither is con-
vincing. Given, however, the resources upon which the Court had
to draw, this is understandable. The case was similar to Reiter 2 8 in
that the legislative history appears neutral on the question, that
precedent really dealt with substantially different factual situa-
tions, and that in the final analysis a general tenet of antitrust
policy prevailed. In Reiter, strong private enforcement was found to
be a necessary corollary to the government's work; in Royal Drug,
exemptions from coverage were strictly construed.
Of course, the most important question has yet to be answered;
that is, whether the provider agreements violate section 1 of the
Sherman Act. The plaintiffs' argued that each provider agreement
constituted a price-fixing agreement which violated it because the
ted), Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co, 440 U.S. 205 (1979). Interestingly, the
majority found it unnecessary to address this distinction.
245. Justice Brennan summed up the dissent as follows:
I would hold that the concept of a provider agreement for benefits promised in the
policy is within the "business of insurance" because some form of provider agreement
is necessary to fulfill the obligations of a service-benefit policy. I would hold that these
provider agreements, Blue Shield's Pharmacy Agreements, are protected because they
(1) directly obtain the very benefits promised in the policy and therefore directly affect
rates, cost, and insurer reliability, and (2) themselves constitute a critical element of
risk "prediction."
440 U.S. at 252-53 (footnotes omitted).
246. Id. at 252.
247. Id. at 253.
248. See part III supra.
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price fixed was too low for independent pharmacists to make a
profit.249 They also intimated a horizontal conspiracy between the
defendant pharmacies20 but did not emphasize the theory. As a
necessary corollary to the price-fixing claim, plaintiffs argued that
they were injured because they were "boycotted" by Blue Shield
subscribers who would patronize participating pharmacies because
they charged less and would fill out reimbursement forms.
The "refusal to deal" charge appears particularly weak because
participation was open on equal terms to any pharmacy that wanted
to join. There was no agreement not to deal with or to boycott
anyone. More colorable is the price-fixing argument, but unless
plaintiffs can prove a horizontal conspiracy among the defendant
pharmacies, this claim should fail.?' Indeed, the Department of
Justice opines that "[transactions at a set price, through a series
of voluntary, bilateral contracts [such as provider agreements], are
not price-fixing even though large numbers of sellers of services may
be involved. '252
What really concerned the plaintiffs was not the alleged price-
fixing agreements themselves; after all, had the price which was
allegedly fixed been high enough, plaintiffs would have been happy
to participate. Rather, their theory in reality was that Blue Shield
was exercising monopsony power, i.e., that Blue Shield was such a
powerful buyer that it could force pharmacies to accept unreasona-
bly low prices.
To the economist, a monopsony, i.e., a market consisting of only
one buyer, is as troublesome as a monopoly. Both result in resource
249. Brief for Respondents at 8-9, Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440
U.S. 205 (1979).
250. Id. at 9.
251. Of course, it is possible that, even absent a direct agreement between pharmacies, the
evidence will support tacit collusion or an inferred agreement. For example, in Blue Cross v.
Commonwealth, 211 Va. 180, 176 S.E.2d 439 (1970), the Supreme Court of Virginia found
such an agreement in a case remarkably similar to this. While that court did not find that
the pharmacists collectively established the dispensing fee, it found that each knew that
others had to participate for the program to be successful. It held that under Interstate Circuit
v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939), this knowledge was sufficient to support the inference
of an agreement.
252. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 11, Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v.
Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
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misallocation; the monopsonistic market draws fewer resources
than would a competitive market, pays those resources a lower re-
turn and produces a smaller output.253 Thus, a true monopsonist
concerns antitrust enforcers. 54 However, that a fringe of providers
have costs in excess of what the purchaser wishes to pay is a poor
indicator of monopsony power.25 Ultimately it will not be surprising
if the plaintiffs, having won the battle, lose the war.
V. ANOTHER BLOW TO ROBINSON-PATMAN ENFORCEMENT: A&P
In 1936, Congress enacted the Robinson-Patman Act 5 in re-
sponse to complaints from small retailers that their suppliers were
selling to them at higher prices than those charged the retailers'
larger competitors, many of which were chain stores. 7 The
253. See generally R. LipsEy & P. STEINER, ECONOMICS 389 (4th ed. 1975).
254. Professor Havilghurst has described the plight of health care providers facing a mon-
opsonist third-party payor as follows:
A monopsonist can exploit producers only where the latter have unrecoverable fixed
costs, making it rational for them to stay in business even though their total costs are
not covered by the price they obtain. By setting a price at least equal to out-of-pocket
costs plus a fair return of recoverable capital, a monopsonist can keep his suppliers in
business while denying them a return on their original investment. But, because little
new capital will be invested in an industry facing a monopsonistic purchaser, the
monopsonist will ultimately have to relax his grip in order to maintain a source of
supply. Health professionals, particularly physicians, are potentially subject to mon-
opsonistic exploitation because their considerable investment in education, including
wages forgone, cannot be recovered and because their alternative employments are not
likely to be as lucrative or personally satisfying. This means that most health profes-
sionals would stay in their professions even if their incomes were drastically reduced,
and it might therefore be tempting to would-be monopsonists-including large pur-
chasing groups, such as labor unions and perhaps the federal government as well-to
take advantage of their vulnerable situation.
Havilghurst, Professional Restraints on Innovation in Health Care inancing, 1978 DUKE
L.J. 303, 328 n.121.
On the other hand, health care providers themselves normally exhibit some degree of
monopoly power which offsets any economic power of third-party payors.
255. The United States minced no words about this:
Nothing in the antitrust laws requires drug purchasers (or Blue Shield acting as their
purchasing agent) to offer the greater compensation necessary to satisfy less efficient
pharmacies or suppliers interested in providing expensive but unwanted services at the
point of sale. To the contrary, antitrust policy seeks to preserve to consumers the
opportunity to obtain a better deal. Its goal is consumer welfare, not competitor wel-
fare.
Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, note 252 supra, at 12.
256. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a, 13b, 21a (1976).
257. See generally F. RoWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT 3-6
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Robinson-Patman Act was aimed at eliminating price discrimina-
tion by sellers, even though the root of the problem was thought to
be the inducement of discriminatory prices by powerful buyers.2 58
The focal point of the Robinson-Patman Act is section 2(a),259
which prohibits vendors from selling "commodities of like grade and
quality""26 to different purchasers at different prices where the effect
"may be substantially to lessen competition . . . with any person
who either grants' or knowingly receives the benefit262 of such dis-
crimination, or with customers of either of them. 12 3
(1962) [hereinafter cited as RowE].
258. See generally E. KINTNER, A ROBINSON-PATMAN PRIMER 251 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as KINTNER]; ROWE, supra note 257, at 421.
259. Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976), in pertinent part
is as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such com-
merce, . . . to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of
like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimi-
nation are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or
resale within the United States . . ., and where the effect of such discrimination may
be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either
grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of
either of them: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials
which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or
delivery . . . . And provided further, That nothing herein contained shall prevent
price changes from time to time where in response to changing conditions affecting the
market for or the marketability of the goods concerned, such as but not limited to
actual or imminent deterioration of perishable goods, obsolescence of seasonal goods,
distress sales under court process, or sales in good faith in discontinuance of business
in the goods concerned.
Section 2(a) sets forth not only that conduct which violates the law, but also two defenses.
Thus, even where a price differential is given a purchaser, it may be "cost justified" where
there are "differences in the cost of manufacturer, sale of delivery" between various purchas-
ers. The so-called "cost justification" defense has been construed narrowly. See, e.g., United
States v. Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460 (1962). In addition, a price differential may be given to
meet "changing conditions." See, e.g., Moore v. Mead Service Co., 190 F.2d 540 (10th Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 902 (1952).
260. The like grade and quality requirement is discussed in FTC v. Universal-Rundle
Corp., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 16,948 (1964), affl'd, 352 F.2d
831 (7th Cir. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 387 U.S. 244 (1967).
261. This supports primary line or so-called "seller level" price discrimination cases where
the price discrimination injures a competitor of the seller. See, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Continen-
tal Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967). See generally RoWE, supra note 257 at 141-171.
262. This supports secondary line or "buyer level" price discrimination cases where a lower
price to one buyer gives it a competitive advantage over its competitors. See, e.g., FTC v.
Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948). See generally RowE, supra note 257 at 172-195.
263. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). This supports third-line injury cases. See, e.g., FTC v.
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Section 2(b) 214 provides the "meeting competition" defense,
which allows the seller to escape liability if a discriminatory price
was necessary to meet the price offered a customer by a competi-
torY.2 1 Section 2(c) 211 prohibits de facto price discrimination by the
buyer paying the seller false brokerage payments.2 17 Sections 2(d)26
and 2(e)26 9 are also aimed at what might be called indirect price
discrimination and require that a seller who offers services, advertis-
ing allowances or similar payments to one buyer, make them avail-
able to that customer's competitors on proportionally equal terms. 20
And finally, section 2(f)21 prohibits buyers from knowingly inducing
or receiving a price discrimination. Interestingly, while the main
concern of Congress in enacting the Robinson-Patman Act was the
power of large buyers, section 2(f), the only section aimed at buyers,
was a legislative afterthought.2 12
It takes little imagination to recognize the inherent tension be-
tween the Robinson-Patman Act and other antitrust principles.
Naturally, any statute that prohibits certain price differentials will
lead to a degree of price rigidity, an anathema to normal antitrust
precepts. The Robinson-Patman Act has been criticized on this
ground not only by the academic community2 3 but by the Depart-
Standard Oil Co., 41 F.T.C. 263, affl'd, 173 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds,
340 U.S. 231 (1951). The Supreme Court has held that no cause of action arises for fourth-
line injury. Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969).
264. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976).
265. The leading cases on the meeting competition defense for our purposes are FTC v.
A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945), and United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
438 U.S. 422 (1978). In Staley, the Court emphasized that the seller need not be sure that it
is meeting a competitor's offer but must only exercise good faith; and good faith requires some
effort (the degree of which varies, depending on the facts) to investigate and verify that a
lower offer has been made and that any informant is reliable. Gypsum made clear that a good
faith effort does not necessitate verifying prices with competitors in a manner which might
violate section 1 of the Sherman Act.
266. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1976).
267. See, e.g., FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166 (1960).
268. 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1976).
269. 15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1976).
270. See generally FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968); FTC v. Simplicity Pattern
Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959).
271. Section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1976), provides "[Ilt
shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce,
knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price which is prohibited by this section."
272. RoWE, supra note 257, at 421, 423-28.
273. An outspoken critic of the Act, Professor Robert Bork of Yale, has said:
CONSISTENCY AND PREDICTABILITY
ment of Justice as well.274 The Department has expressed particular
concern about section 2(f) because of its narcotic effect on buyers:
The buyer liability provision, moreover, strikes at a process which is
fundamental to a competitive market: the process by which each
buyer negotiates for itself the best possible price. It was, of course,
the intent of the statute's drafters to discourage the user of coercive
buyer pressure. Section 2(f), however, is not limited to such situa-
tions and operates without regard to the relative market power of the
parties. The Section thus instills extreme caution in buyers negotiat-
ing for price breaks which, if obtained, might arguably subject them
to liability under Section 2(f).2 s
Thus, the Robinson-Patman Act does not enjoy the almost universal
support that the Sherman Act does.
The Supreme Court's decision this term in Great Atlantic & Pa-
cific Tea Co. v. FTC271 highlights the relationship between sections
2(a), 27 2(b), and section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act.278 Few of
The attempt to counter the supposed threat to competition posed by price discrimi-
nation constitutes what is surely antitrust's least glorious hour. The instrument fash-
ioned for the task was the Robinson-Patman Act, the mishappen progeny of intolerable
draftsmanship coupled to wholly mistaken economic theory. . . .Although it does not
prevent much price discrimination. . . it has stifled a deal of competition.
R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox: A PoLIcY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 382 (1978).
274. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr
(1977). One conclusion of the Department of Justice was that."[tihe Robinson-Patman Act
has several significant costs to society. Its most pernicious effects are its reinforcement of
pricing rigidity among sellers in oligopolistic industries, the introduction of pricing inflexibil-
ity, and the encouragement of price discussions among competitors which may lead to viola-
tions of the Sherman Act." Id. at 99.
275. Id. at 32-33. The Report also notes that:
By discouraging bargaining on part of the buyers, Robinson-Patman decreases the
possibility that a retailer will receive a lower price, pass it on to the consumer, and
thus initiate a competitive struggle in the retailing sector which will ultimately result
in more efficient operation and lower prices for the consumer.
Id. at 257.
276. 440 U.S. 69 (1979). It is somewhat ironic that the Court's major pronouncement to
date on a buyer's liability under the Robinson-Patman Act exonerated A&P, for as Represent-
ative Patman said in 1956, "[O]ne certain big concern had really caused the passage of this
act, the A. & P. Tea Co." Proposed Amendments to Sections 2 and 3 of the Clayton Act:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1956).
277. It might be helpful to examine how a section 2(a) case is structured. The plaintiff,
whether a private party or the Federal Trade Commission, must first prove four so-called
"jurisdictional" elements. First, the seller must have made at least two sales to different
1979]
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the facts were in dispute. The case centered on A&P's negotiations
and contract with Borden, Inc., by which Borden was to supply
dairy products under A&P's private label to some 200 A&P stores
in portions of Illinois and Indiana."' Negotiations began in late
1964, when Borden made four offers for A&P's business, each one
of which was refused. The last would have reduced A&P's cost for
dairy products some $410,000.s0 A&P then decided to put the con-
tract out on bid and received a bid from Bowman Dairy that would
have saved some $737,000. An A&P buyer called and told Borden
that its bid was much too high.28' Borden recalculated and offered
a contract which would save A&P some $820,000 per year, specifi-
cally telling A&P that it was "meeting competition. '28 2 A&P then
told Borden to "sharpen your pencil a little bit because you are not
quite there, ' ' 283 and Borden then made an even slightly better offer24
purchasers within a reasonably short period of time. See generally Bruce's Juices, Inc. v.
American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743 (1947). Second, the sales must be of commodities. See
generally General Shale Prod. Corp. v. Struck Const. Co., 132 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 318 U.S. 780 (1943). Third, the commodities must be of like grade and quality.
Finally, at least one of the sales must be in interstate commerce. See generally Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186 (1974).
Assuming the jurisdictional elements are shown, the plaintiff proves a prima facie case by
showing in addition, first, a price discrimination (and "a price discrimination . . . is merely
a price difference," FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960)), and second, that the
price discrimination had the requisite anticompetitive effects at the primary, secondary or
tertiary lines. See notes 261-63 supra.
The seller may rebut the prima facie showing by proving that its discrimination was cost
justified or in response to changing conditions pursuant to the provisos of section 2(a), or that
the discrimination was given in good faith to meet a competitor's offer. See generally
KINTNER, note 258 supra, at 18-28.
278. One authority has noted that to prove a violation of section 2(f), plaintiff must
"establish all the elements of a 2(a) violation" and "show that . . . the buyer deals in
interstate commerce, . . . the buyer's purchase was in interstate commerce, and . . . that
the inducing buyer knew or should have known that the price would cause the seller to violate
the provisions of Section 2(a)." KINTNER, note 258 supra, at 252. See generally RowE, note
257 supra, at 437-43.
279. The factual summary advanced here is drawn from the Administrative Law Judge's
opinion in Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 87 F.T.C. 962 (1976).
280. Id. at 974-77.
281. Testimony revealed that A&P told Borden that its bid was "so far out of line that it
is not even funny. You are not even in the ball park. . . . [The Bowman] bid is so far
different from yours that there isn't any comparison." Id. at 978.
282. Id. at 979.
283. Id.
284. The Borden negotiator testified that he told A&P that the offer was "given to you by
us on the feeling and belief that we are meeting a competitive bid. We knew of no other way
to justify this." Id. at 980 (emphasis by FTC Administrative Law Judge).
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which A&P accepted.
In 1971, the Federal Trade Commission filed a three-count com-
plaint charging, first, that A&P violated section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act2s5 by not telling Borden that its offer not only
met that of Bowman, but substantially beat it.ss The second count
alleged that A&P knowingly induced and received a price discrimi-
nation in violation of section 2(f), and the third charged A&P with
price-fixing. 287
On the first count, the Administrative Law Judge found that
A&P, knowing that Borden thought its bid just met competition,
misrepresented the situation by not telling Borden that its bid not
only met, but beat, Bowman's; thus he found a violation of section
5. 218 For the same reason, he found that A&P had induced and
received a price discrimination violative of section 2(f) .2S9 A&P
argued that, for it to violate section 2(f), Borden must have violated
section 2(a). A&P claimed that section 2(a) was not violated be-
cause Borden thought it was meeting competition. Borden thus sat-
isfied the section 2(b) defense of meeting competition, precluding a
section 2(f) violation by A&P. The administrative law judge held,
however, that it was far from clear that Borden could sustain the
"meeting competition" defense because it had done little to verify
Bowman's bid.29 In addition, he held that, even if Borden could
sustain the defense, A&P was not exonerated automatically.291 This
conclusion flowed, he said, from Kroger Co. v. FTC,292 where the
court had found a buyer liable under section 2(f), even where the
seller had sustained the "meeting competition" defense, because
the buyer had lied to the seller about other offers.
21
285. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
286. 87 F.T.C. at 965.
287. This count was dismissed by the Administrative Law Judge, 87 F.T.C. at 1032, and
played no part in the Court's later decision; therefore, it is not discussed here.
288. According to the Commission, "There was no obligation upon A&P to divulge the
name of the competitor or the actual price offered by a competitor. It was sufficient if it had
informed Borden that the meeting competition defense was not available." Id. at 96-97.
289. Id. at 1022.
290. See note 265 supra.
291. 87 F.T.C. at 1021.
292. 438 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir. 1971). See text accompanying note 305 infra.
293. The Administrative Law Judge found that A&P misrepresented the Bowman offer to
Borden. 87 F.T.C. at 1022. Because, however, later courts appeared to disregard any A&P
misrepresentations, that matter is not discussed here.
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Thus, the issues were set. First, must a violation of section 2(a)
be shown before liability under 2(f) can flow? And second, could
Borden sustain the "meeting competition" defense of section 2(b),
thus negating a violation of section 2(a)?
To understand the tension created between sections 2(a) and 2(f),
it is crucial to understand that a successful "meeting competition"
defense depends on the seller's good faith, not that of the buyerY.2 4
Thus, even where the seller makes an offer substantially lower than
that of its competitors, it will sustain the "meeting competition"
defense if it acted in good faith and made a reasonable effort to
"investigate -or verify" its competitor's offer295 (short of having to
verify an offer with its competitors) .211 Where the seller knows the
competitor's offer, he can meet but cannot undercut it.217 Some-
times, however, as in this case, the seller may honestly believe he
is meeting competition (thus sustaining the defense), but the buyer
knows full well that the seller is not only meeting, but substantially
beating, the competitor's offer. If section 2(f) cannot be violated
without a section 2(a) violation, the buyer may be "culpable" in the
sense that he knew he was receiving a discriminatory price which
would be illegal if the seller knew the true facts, but escapes liability
even so.
The argument that section 2(a) liability must precede section 2(f)
liability rests in part on the language of section 2(f) itself, which
requires the receipt of a "discrimination in price which is prohibited
by this section. '2 98 Additional support is found in the Court's deci-
sion in Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 9 which dealt with a totally
different issue; that is, which party must go forward with evidence
of a "cost justification," "meeting competition," or "changing con-
ditions" defense in a suit under section 2(f) .31 While the result in
294. See note 278 supra. Moreover, the Supreme Court has made clear that meeting com-
petition is a complete defense to a section 2(a) charge. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S.
231 (1951).
295. FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 758 (1945).
296. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
297. See, e.g., National Dairy Prod. Corp., 70 F.T.C. 79 (1966), affl'd, 395 F.2d 517 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 977 (1968).
298. 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1976).
299. 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
300. In Automatic Canteen, the Commission showed that the buyer knew the prices it
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Automatic Canteen is of little interest here, the Court's analysis
provided language helpful to the argument that section 2(f) is not
violated unless section 2(a) is. For example, the Court noted that
section 2(f) is "roughly the counterpart, as to buyers, of sections of
the Act dealing with discrimination by sellers. . . ,,3o, More impor-
tantly, the Court concluded in dicta that "a buyer is not liable
under section 2(f) if the lower prices he induces are either within one
of the seller's defenses . or not known by him not to be within
one of those defenses.""3 2 In addition, leading commentators have
noted that section 2(f) liability is a derivative of section 2(a) liabil-
ity"3 and that "it was the professed intention of Congress to have
buyers liable for inducing any seller violation of the act. . . 34
The only case which reaches an arguably opposite result is Kroger
Co. v. FTC,15 relied on by the Administrative Law Judge in A&P,
in which the Commission expressly absolved the seller from section
received were some one-third lower than those received by its competitors from the same
supplier. It then rested, placing nothing about absence of cost justification in the record.
Automatic put on no evidence of cost justification. The Seventh Circuit upheld the Commis-
sion's determination that a prima facie case was made, Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 194
F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1952), and said the Commission was under no obligation to show absence
of cost justification.
The Supreme Court held that to show that the buyer "knowingly" received an illegal price
discrimination the Commission must at least come forward with evidence negating Robinson-
Patman defenses where information concerning such a defense (in this case, the seller's costs)
could be obtained more easily by the seller than by the buyer. 440 U.S. at 82-84.
301. 346 U.S. at 63. In an understatement, the Court also noted that "precision of expres'
sion is not an outstanding characteristic of the Robinson-Patman Act .... Id. at 65.
302. Id. at 74. Prior to this conclusion, the Court had explained that
the discriminatory price that buyers are forbidden by § 2(f) to induce cannot include
price differentials that are not forbidden to sellers in other sections of the Act ...
For we are not dealing simply with a "discrimination in price"; the "discrimination
in price" in § 2(f) must be one "which is prohibited by this section." Even if any price
differential were to be comprehended within the term "discrimination in price," § 2(f),
which speaks of prohibited discriminations, cannot be read as declaring out of bounds
price differentials within one or more of the "defenses" available to sellers, such as...
bona fide attempts to meet competition ...
Id. at 70-71 (footnotes omitted).
303. "[The legal status of the buyer is derivative from the seller's pricing legality under
the Act, and is confined to a buyer's 'knowing' receipt of the seller's illicit price discrimina-
tion." RowE, supra note 257, at 420.
304. KINTNER, supra note 258, at 252.
305. 438 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir. 1971). See text accompanying notes 292-93 supra. Interest-
ingly, two judges of the three-judge panel were the late Justice Tom C. Clark and Wade H.
McCree, Jr., present Solicitor General of the United States.
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2(a) liability and yet held the buyer, Kroger, liable under section
2(f). The facts were similar to those in A&P. Kroger, too, had de-
cided to market private label dairy products and requested bids. A
major difference was that Kroger's purchasing agent clearly lied to
one bidder about other bids which had been submitted, claiming
others were lower when they were not. On the basis of this prevarica-
tion, a seller reduced his bid to a clearly discriminatory level.
The seller was charged with a violation of section 2(a) but sus-
tained the meeting competition defense. Kroger argued that such a
finding, by itself, meant that a 2(f) violation was impossible. The
court held, however, that while this may ordinarily be true, Kroger's
misrepresentations negated the argument.3 °8 It explained that the
meeting competition defense, when relevant to a section 2(f) case,
had to be examined from both the standpoints of what the seller
knew, and what the buyer knew. 7 According to the court, "[T]o
hold otherwise. . . would put a premium on the buyer's artifice and
cunning in inducing discriminatory prices."3 8 Thus, since Kroger's
misrepresentation had induced a discriminatory price which it knew
not only met, but substantially beat, any competitor's price, it
could be held liable under section 2(f).
When the initial decision in A&P was reviewed,"' the full Federal
Trade Commission dismissed the first count, which had alleged that
A&P had an affirmative duty to tell Borden that its price was lower
than Bowman's. The Commission believed that such a disclosure
obligation would stop buyers from bargaining for low prices.310 While
306. 438 F.2d at 1374.
307. Id. at 1377.
308. Id.
309. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 87 F.T.C. 1047 (1976).
310. The Commission's logic was as follows:
The imposition of a duty of affirmative disclosure, applicable to a buyer whenever a
seller states that his offer is intended to meet competition, is contrary to normal
business practice and, we think, contrary to the public interest.
We are fearful that such a change would harm the freedom of buyers to engage in
aggressive bargaining over price and would thereby affect competitive distribution. As
the [REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL's NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAws 196 (1955)] stated, "Legalistic impediments to the normal bargaining process
.. .might well deprive the public of gains that under effective competition it has a
right to expect. . . ." We fear a scenario where the seller automatically attaches a
meeting competition caveat to every bid. The buyer would then state whether such
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it may not be wise to require the buyer to disclose that one offer
beats another under section 5, evidently it is under section 2(f),
since the Commission affirmed the initial decision.311 It noted that
the evidence must show, aside from any defenses, a violation of
section 2(a), some "knowledge" of receiving an illegal price, and
that the buyer can raise defenses which the seller could, including
the meeting competition defense.31 2 But the Commission agreed
with the Kroger holding313 that, in a section 2(f) case, the meeting
competition defense must be viewed from the buyer's standpoint .31
The Second Circuit affirmed s.31 Explaining that the Commission's
burden was to show that A&P received a lower price than its com-
petitors, and that A&P knew the prices it received violated 2(a), it
held that a prima facie case of section 2(f) liability had been
made .3 Then, after noting that the buyer could rebut the prima
facie case by sustaining one of the seller's defenses, the court ac-
cepted the Kroger rationale and held that, since A&P knew Bor-
den's bid beat the competition, A&P could not sustain the de-
fense.317 Indeed, the court went further than Kroger and held that
no material misrepresentation by the buyer was necessary to trigger
the Kroger rule.3 8 Accordingly, it enforced the Commission's
bid meets, beats, or loses to another bid. The seller would then submit a second, a
third, and perhaps a fourth bid until finally he is able to ascertain his competitor's
bid.
87 F.T.C. at 1050-51.
311. 87 F.T.C. at 1066.
312. Id. at 1051.
313. See text accompanying notes 305-08 supra.
314. 87 F.T.C. at 1055. The Commission noted that if A&P had believed that Borden's bid
was no better than Bowman's, the meeting competition defense would be sustained. But, the
Commission emphasized that, while the Administrative Law Judge had not decided whether
Borden had a meeting competition defense, it felt it "very probable that Borden did not have
such a defense." 87 F.T.C. at 1057 n. 19 (emphasis in original). This flowed from the Commis-
sion's belief that Borden made too little effort to verify Bowman's bid. "It should have asked
A&P for more information about the competing bid." Id.
315. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1977).
316. Id. at 981. See note 277 supra.
317. Any other rule, according to the court, would mean "that large buyers could consis-
tently play one seller off against another to the point where all bids are below sellers' costs
and then in reliance upon the sellers' potential good faith and its 'meeting competition'
defenses, thus vindicate the final price." 557 F.2d at 982-83.
318. The court stated:
While Kroger did indeed involve a "lying buyer," we do not regard the Sixth Circuit's
ruling as strictly limited to the situation where the charged buyer affirmatively lied to
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order."9
The Supreme Court rejected the Second Circuit's approach 2 ' and
held that if Borden was protected by the meeting competition de-
fense, A&P was also.321 Then, it went further and held that Borden
would have sustained the defense, 322 notwithstanding the Commis-
sion's intimation to the contrary.323
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority,324 first explained that
the explicit language of section 2(f), its legislative history, 32 and the
Court's only previous case interpreting the section, Automatic
Canteen,326 all indicated that no 2(f) violation could occur unless
2(a) were violated. Noting that 2(f) prohibits only discriminations
which are prohibited "by this section, "327 the Court stated categori-
cally that "[u]nder the plain meaning of section 2(f), . . . a buyer
cannot be liable if a prima facie case could not be established
against a seller or if the seller has an affirmative defense. ' 32 8 Accord-
ing to the Court, Automatic Canteen held the same thing; there, the
Court had said that an illegal section 2(f) discrimination had to be
"forbidden to sellers in other sections of the Act. 3 2 Thus 2(f) is not
violated "if the lower prices received are justified by reason of one
of the seller's affirmative defenses. '3 0
the seller. The rule that the "meeting competition" defense must be looked at from
the buyer's perspective where the buyer is charged under § 2(f) is a salutary and correct
one, whether the buyer lies or merely keeps quiet about the nature of the competing
bid it has already been offered.
Id. at 983.
319. Id. at 988.
320. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69 (1979).
321. Id. at 76.
322. Id. at 85.
323. See note 314 supra.
324. Burger, C.J., and Brennan, Blackmun, Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., formed the majority.
White and Marshall, JJ., concurred and dissented in part in separate opinions. Stevens, J.,
took no part.
325. This prong of the Court's attack was quite brief, relying only on a brief statement from
the House Conference Report which noted that 2(f) applied to discriminations that are illegal
under "the first paragraph," or section 2(a), of the statute. 80 CONG. Rac. 9419 (1936). 440
U.S. at 77 n.10.
326. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953). See notes 299-303 supra.
327. 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1970).
328. 440 U.S. at 76.
329. Id. at 77 (quoting Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. at 70 (1953)).
330. Id. at 78
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The Court specifically rejected the Commission's argument that,
in a section 2(f) case, the meeting competition defense should rise
or fall on what the buyer knows. First, as it explained above, the
wording of the statute itself belied such an interpretation. But per-
haps more importantly, the Court feared that requiring the buyer
to notify the seller that its offer beat that of a competitor would
"help give rise to a price uniformity and rigidity in open conflict
with the purposes of other antitrust legislation" 33 by negating com-
petitive bidding and causing competitors to match each other's
prices.3 ' Thus, if section 2(b) shielded Borden from liability, it
shielded A&P also.
Interestingly, the Court relegated Kroger, and the question
whether a "lying buyer" is more susceptible to a section 2(f) charge
than one who simply says nothing about a discriminatory low price,
to a footnote.33 Finding that A&P had made no material misrepre-
sentations, the Court found it unnecessary to accept or reject the
Kroger result.
Having determined that A&P could not be liable under 2(f) if
Borden could sustain the meeting competition defense, the Court
next examined whether Borden would have met section 2(b)'s bur-
den of showing that its price "was made in good faith to meet an
equally low price of a competitor" 35 if that issue had been tried. It
first explained the Staley-Gypsum336 test, i.e., that the seller need
331. Id. at 80 (quoting Automatic Canteen, 346 U.S. at 63).
332. 440 U.S. at 80. Interestingly, the Commission brushed this major concern of the
Court aside with a rather weak retort:
A buyer that merely solicits bids and accepts the lowest offer would not violate Section
2(f); something more is necessary. The Robinson-Patman Act demands a showing of
competitive injury as a prerequisite to a finding that a particular inducement or receipt
of a discriminatory price is unlawful. The Act thus provides a built-in guarantee that
enforcement of Section 2(f) will not produce anticompetitive effects.
Brief for the Federal Trade Commission at 40, Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S.
69 (1979). What the brief fails to mention is that, once a discrimination is shown, the requisite
competitive effect is almost a foregone conclusion, especially in a secondary-line case. See
FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948). See generally UNrrEn STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE ROBiNSON-PATMAN ACT 10-11 (1977).
333. 440 U.S. at 81-82 n.15.
334. Id.
335. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1970).
336. See note 265 supra.
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only reasonably believe that it is meeting competition . 37 Then, it
compared Borden's actions with those facts posited in Gypsum that
might be relevant in determining the seller's good faith in investi-
gating and verifying that a lower offer had been made. These in-
cluded "[1] evidence that a seller had received reports of similar
discounts from other customers, [2] threatened . . . termination of
purchases if the discount were not met, [3] [e]fforts to corroborate
the reported discount by seeking documentary evidence, [and 4]
the seller's past experience with the particular buyer."' 5 The Court
found that Borden (1) was faced with losing A&P's business unless
it lowered its offer, (2) attempted to obtain more information about
its competitor's offer from A&P, and (3) had experienced a good
relationship with A&P in the past and thus had no reason to doubt
its veracity. In addition, Borden had specifically told A&P that, by
its offer, it was meeting competition.3" From these actions, it was
clear to the Court that Borden had done all it could to assure that
it was meeting competition. The Court concluded, since Borden
would have sustained the defense, A&P did not violate section
2(f) .340
Justice White agreed that a section 2(f) violation required a sec-
tion 2(a) violation, but he objected to the majority deciding the
meeting competition question when it had not been decided below.
He would have remanded the case to the Commission for a hearing
on that issue.3 41
Justice Marshall agreed with Justice White that the meeting
competition issue should be remanded.3 42 However he went further
and also objected to the other prong of the majority holding-that
a section 2(a) violation by the seller is always a condition precedent
for a section 2(f) violation. Arguing that section 2(0's "prohibited
by this section" language should be read more broadly, he posited
that Congress meant that the same general affirmative defenses
337. The Court emphasized that "[slince good faith, rather than absolute certainty, is the
touchstone of the meeting competition defense, a seller can assert the defense even if it has
unknowingly made a bid that in fact not only met but beat his competition." 440 U.S. at 83.
338. 438 U.S. at 455.
339. 440 U.S. at 84. See note 284 and text accompanying note 282 supra.
340. Id. at 85.
341. Id. at 85 (White, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
342. Id. at 90 (Marshall J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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were available to buyer and seller-not that a buyer automatically
escaped section 2(f) liability just because the seller escaped section
2(a) exposure.3 3 Justice Marshall would follow the strict Kroger
analysis and hold that where the buyer misrepresents a competitor's
offer, it cannot claim the defense. Where, however, the buyer "acted
in good faith to induce the seller to meet a competitor's price, re-
gardless of whether the seller's price happens to beat the competi-
tor's," 34 the defense would apply.
Thus, for the second straight term, the Court has reduced the
efficacy of the Robinson-Patman Act. Last term, in Gypsum, it held
that the verification of prices by sellers with each other, ostensibly
to meet the good faith test of section 2(b), was not insulated from
attack as price-fixing.345 As a matter of policy, the Court was not
willing to let the Robinson-Patman Act lead to price stabilization
by allowing competitors to exchange sensitive price information.31
The Court went even further. and held that, if such inter-seller veri-
fication were the only way to otherwise sustain the defense, the
defense would not be available.3 7
The Court's A&P decision adds to the decline of the Robinson-
Patman Act. It is difficult to envision a situation where the buyer
cannot orchestrate a circumvention of 2(f) liability by simply refus-
ing to discuss its offers from other sellers. A seller has two basic
sources of information on competitors' offers-competing sellers and
the buyer. Under Gypsum, it had best not talk to its competitors,
and the buyer has no obligation to tell what it knows. Thus, by its
own action, the buyer can insure that a seller sustains the meeting
competition defense, while, at the same time, negate the buyer's
exposure under section 2(f).
Given the economic conditions at the time of Robinson-Patman
Act passage, and the statute's clear purpose to alleviate the effects
343. Id. Justice Marshall believed that, while the majority stated it was not deciding the
Kroger lying buyer issue, it effectively held that the fact the buyer lied was irrelevant.
344. Id. at 88.
345. See note 265 supra.
346. 438 U.S. at 457. Interestingly, however, both Kroger and the Second Circuit's decision
in A&P were cited with seeming approval. Id. at 455 n. 30.
347. Id. at 455-56. One gets the feeling, from the Court's discussion about why Borden met
the 2(b) test, see text accompanying notes 338-39, supra, that it will find extremely few, or
perhaps no, situations where good faith cannot be shown.
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of chain store buying power on small business,348 there is no doubt
that Congress intended to prohibit conduct such as A&P's. Fortun-
ately, in a different era "the often ambiguous Robinson-Patman
Act, 349 as Justice Marshall put it, could be interpreted to allow
sellers to seek lower prices, which ultimately are passed-on to con-
sumers through the competitive process.
VI. ACCESS TO GRAND JURY MATERIALS: Douglas Oil
Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest30 was the only decision
this term not similar to a case decided during the past two terms. 35'
Perhaps this is because it was not an antitrust case in the sense that
it raised issues that are not peculiar to the antitrust laws or antitrust
enforcement. It discussed important questions that can arise in any
criminal enforcement setting, especially where the scenario is such
that civil damage suits often follow on the heels of a criminal prose-
cution. This pattern is most common in the antitrust arena.
The facts in Petrol Stops were straightforward.35 2 In 1972, the
Antitrust Division commenced a criminal price-fixing investigation
of Douglas Oil, Phillips Petroleum and other oil companies. In 1975,
after several employees of the targets had testified before a grand
jury in the Central District of California, the grand jury returned an
indictment to which the defendants pleaded nolo contendere.353
Immediately before the plea, the defendants requested, and were
given, grand jury transcripts of their employees' testimony pursuant
to Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(A).
In December of 1973, Petrol Stops filed an antitrust suit in the
District of Arizona,354 charging the defendants with violating section
1 of the Sherman Act by conduct which led to the later criminal nolo
contendere pleas. In response to interrogatories, the defendants de-
348. See text accompanying notes 257-58 supra.
349. 440 U.S. at 90 n.3 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
350. 441 U.S. 211 (1979).
351. See text accompanying notes 1-3 supra.
352. The factual summary which follows is from the Supreme Court's opinion. See Douglas
Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 213-217 (1979).
353. United States v. Phillips Petrol. Co., No. 75-377 (C.D. Cal. filed Dec. 3, 1975). A
consent decree was entered later in the government's companion civil suit. United States v.
Phillips Petrol. Co., [1977-2] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 61,732 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
354. Several other plaintiffs later filed suit.
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nied that they had communicated about prices with each other or
had documents involving any such communications. The plaintiffs,
believing that the responses were not consistent with the nolo pleas,
filed document requests for the grand jury transcripts which had
been given to defendants. When the defendants objected, the plain-
tiffs filed a motion in the California court under Fed. R. Crim. P.
6(e),355 asking for access to the grand jury transcripts. The United
States did not object.
The district court granted the motion over the defendants' objec-
tions and ordered the Antitrust Division to transmit to the plaintiffs
the grand jury transcripts and documents. It required, however,
that the information be disclosed only to counsel for the plaintiffs,
that it be used only in connection with the pending civil antitrust
355. FED. R. Cram. P. 6(e), in pertinent part, is as follows:
(e) Secrecy of Proceedings and Disclosure.-.
(1) General Rule.-A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a
recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the
Government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (2)(A)(ii) of
this subdivision shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand jury, except as
otherwise provided for in these rules. No obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any
person except in accordance with this rule. A knowing violation pf rule 6 may be
punished as a contempt of court.
(2) Exceptions.-
(A) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before
the grand jury, other than its deliberations and the vote of any grand juror, may
be made to-
(i) an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such
attorney's duty; and
(ii) such government personnel as are deemed necessary by an attor-
ney for the government to assist an attorney for the government in the
performance of such attorney's duty to enforce Federal criminal law.
(B), Any person to whom matters are disclosed under subparagraph (A)(ii)
of this paragraph shall not utilize that grand jury material for any purpose other
than assisting the attorney for the government in the performance of such attor-
ney's duty to enforce Federal criminal law. An attorney for the government shall
promptly provide the district court, before which was impaneled the grand jury
whose material has been so disclosed, with the names of the persons to whom
such disclosure has been made.
(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before
the grand jury may also be made-
(i) when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with
a judicial proceeding; or
(ii) when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant, upon
a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment
because of matters occurring before the grand jury.
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cases, that it be used only to impeach or refresh the recollection of
a witness, that no information be copied, and that the materials be
returned to the Antitrust Division after use. Thus, significant efforts
were made to insure that all information encompassed by the order
would not be circulated. Importantly, however, the Court did not
ask the Arizona court, where the civil action was filed, to determine
whether the plaintiffs needed the materials.
This factual background sets the stage for the Supreme Court's
examination of two issues. First, what standards should be used to
determine whether grand jury secrecy should be broken and materi-
als turned over to private plaintiffs? And second, which court-that
where the grand jury sat or that where a follow-up civil suit is
filed-should determine whether the party requesting the materials
has made an adequate showing?
The question of what justifications must be shown for disclosure
of grand jury transcripts is of obvious importance and can appear
in a multitude of settings. For example, the request can be made
by a defendant in a criminal action,"8 a private plaintiff in a subse-
quent civil action, 357 a state bringing either a proprietary civil ac-
tion358 or a parens patriae action 359 under the recently enacted sec-
tion 4C of the Clayton Act,360 or even by a committee of the United
States Senate. 36' The criminal action may be in progress or com-
pleted,32 and have resulted in no indictment 3 3 or an indictment and
conviction,364 nolo contendere plea365 or finding of not guilty. The
movant may request all grand jury materials 36 or only a part
356. Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966).
357. Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211 (1979).
358. Illinois v. Sarbaugh, 552 F.2d 768 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. J.L. Simmons Co.
v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 889 (1977).
359. Montgomery County Real Estate Antitrust Litigation v. Jack Foley Realty, Inc., 452
F. Supp. 54 (D. Md. 1978).
360. 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1976).
361. In re Grand Jury Investigation of Uranium Industry, No. 78-0173 (D.D.C., filed June
8, 1979).
362. Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559 (D. Minn. 1968).
363. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 667 (1958).
364. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
365. United States v. Colonial Chevrolet Corp., No. 78-106-N (E.D. Va. filed May 23,
1979).
366. Montgomery County Real Estate Antitrust Litigation v. Jack Foley Realty, Inc.,452
F. Supp. 54 (D. Md. 1978).
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thereof;367 his purpose may be to use the materials as a general
discovery tool368 or, more specifically, to impeach a witness369 or
refresh his recollection. The materials may3 0 or may not 37' have
already been turned over to the defendant. The witness whose testi-
mony the movant wants may or may not have testified at trial3 2 or
otherwise be known to the defendant. The subsequent civil action
may have been either filed 373 or still in contemplation when the
request was made.7 Thus, each situation where grand jury materi-
als are requested, while perhaps not unique, will present a matrix
of variables which must be closely examined before a determination
can be made whether to release the requested materials.
The starting point in discussing when grand jury secrecy should
be broken is United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co.375 There, after
a grand jury failed to return an antitrust indictment, the govern-
ment filed a civil suit and used the grand jury transcript to prepare
for trial. In discovery proceedings, the trial judge ordered the gov-
ernment to produce the transcript for Proctor & Gamble. Rather
than comply, the government allowed the court to dismiss its com-
plaint and then appealed. 76
The Court began its analysis by explaining the "long-established
policy that maintains the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings in
the federal courts. '377 Drawing from United States v. Rose,378 it
listed the reasons for grand jury secrecy:
1. To prevent the escape of persons who may be indicted;
367. Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559 (D. Minn. 1968) (subpoenas
and witness lists).
368. ABC Great Stores, Inc. v. Globe Ticket Co., 309 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
369. Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966).
370. Texas v. United States Steel Corp., 546 F.2d 626 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 889
(1977).
371. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
372. In the Matter of Grand Jury which Presented Criminal Indictments 76-149 and 77-72
(Anthracite Coal), No. 78-176 (M.D. Pa. filed No. 14, 1978).
373. United States Industries, Inc. v. United States District Court, 345 F.2d 18 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965).
374. Application of Ca. to Inspect Grand Jury Subpoenas, 195 F. Supp. 37 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
375. 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
376. Id. at 680.
377. Id. at 681.
378. 215 F.2d 617 (3d Cir. 1954).
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2. To assure freedom in grand jury deliberations;
3. To prevent outsiders from annoying the grand jurors;
4. To prevent witness tampering;
5. To encourage people with information about crimes to come
forward; and
6. To protect exonerated grand jury targets from adverse
publicity.37
The greatest emphasis was placed on the grand jury secrecy's
effect of encouraging witnesses to testify fully without fear that their
testimony might later be discovered and used to harm them. The
Court noted that this possibility of retaliation was especially impor-
tant in the antitrust context because "[t]he witnesses . . . may be
employees or even officers of potential defendants, or their custom-
ers, their competitors, [or] their suppliers. '38 0
Next, the Court advanced the proper standard. Grand jury se-
crecy, it said, should be broken only where a "compelling necessity"
is shown; and moreover, such a necessity "must be shown with
particularity. ' 38 ' In dicta, the Court explained that "particularized
need" would include use of the transcript at trial to refresh recollec-
tion, to test credibility and to impeach, and that, in such situations,
"the secrecy of the proceedings is lifted discretely and limitedly. '32
On the other hand, the fact that access would save time or reduce
costs is not sufficient.
The following year, the Court decided Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.
v. United States, 3 3 which is important because of its dissenting
opinion. After conviction under section 1 of the Sherman Act, the
defendants appealed because they were not allowed to examine the
grand jury testimony of a key government trial witness. Again, the
Court emphasized the necessity for grand jury secrecy, especially,
it said, "in antitrust proceedings where fear of business reprisal
might haunt both the grand juror and the witness."3 4 The Court
379. Id. at 628-29.
380. 356 U.S. at 682.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 683.
383. 360 U.S. 395 (1959).
384. Id. at 400.
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then noted that the defendants had not attempted to show a parti-
cularized need, arguing instead that they had a right to the mate-
rial. It rejected the existence of any such right. 385
In a sharp dissent, four Justices accused the Court of making
secrecy an end in itself without examining the reasons for secrecy
and determining if they applied in that particular case. 36 They
examined the traditional reasons for secrecy, i.e., preventing escape,
protecting those not indicted, precluding retaliation, and encourag-
ing uninhibited grand jury deliberation,"' but concluded that
"[t]he Court, while making obeisance to 'a long-established policy'
of secrecy, makes no showing whatever how denial of. . . grand jury
testimony serves any of the purposes justifying secrecy." ' Because
the grand jury and trial proceedings were concluded and the witness
had testified, the possibility of escape, retaliation and the protec-
tion of those not indicted were insufficient reasons to maintain se-
crecy. In addition, portions of the transcript that mentioned grand
juror names or contained grand jury deliberations or opinions could
be removed from materials handed over. The dissenters concluded
that "[tihe Court's insistence on secrecy exalts the principle of
secrecy for secrecy's sake."3 9
If the dissent in Pittsburgh Plate Glass signalled some erosion in
the totality of grand jury secrecy, the Court's decision in Dennis v.
United States90 showed that the dissent was taken to heart by the
Court. Dennis was a non-antitrust criminal case in which the trial
judge had denied the defendants' motion to require production of
the grand jury tegtimony of four government witnesses. The trial
court had held that the defendants' particularized need, the possi-
bility of inconsistency between the witnesses' grand jury and trial
testimony, was not sufficient to allow access. The Court disagreed
and reversed, thus beginning a trend which has eased the Proctor
& Gamble burden. 91
385. Id. at 401.
386. Id. at 403 (Brennan, J., dissenting; Warren, C.J., Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring
in the dissent).
387. Id. at 405.
388. Id. at 406.
389. Id. at 407.
390. 384 U.S. 855 (1966).
391. See generally 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 108 (1969 & Supp.
1979).
1979]
74 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:11
The facts of eich of these three Supreme Court decisions are
significantly different from those in Petrol Stops and other treble
damage actions following a government indictment. In each of these
cases, it was the defendant in the criminal case (or, as in Proctor &
Gamble, an analogous civil case)392 who wanted the transcript rather
than a third party who had filed a treble damage action. Such a
defendant certainly presents a stronger case for access, and today,
in light of Dennis, Rule 16, and other criminal procedural safe-
guards, a defendant normally may have access to grand jury materi-
als. Furthermore, this often will work to the advantage of a treble
damage plaintiff, because whether the defendant has the transcript
is clearly material to whether the plaintiff will be given access . 93
What constitutes a particularized need, enabling a' plaintiff to
obtain grand jury materials, is not clear. What is clear is that, with
the possible exception of parens patriae suits by state attorneys
general, 394 a need more compelling than the general helpfulness of
the materials for discovery purposes is necessary.39  Many cases
evince a rather mechanistic approach in denying access. Others,
however, appear to balance the policies underlying secrecy against
392. See text accompanying notes 375-76 supra.
393. See, e.g., Illinois v. Sarbaugh, 552 F.2d 768 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. J.L.
Simmons Co. v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 889 (1977).
394. See text accompanying notes 428-36, infra.
395. See, e.g., Application of California to Inspect Grand Jury Subpoenas, 195 F. Supp.
37 (E.D. Pa. 1961). There California wanted to examine grand jury subpoenas in determining
whether to file a civil antitrust action in the so-called electrical equipment conspiracy cases
and argued that access would save it time and money and thus was in the public interest.
This rationale was rejected.
Similarly, in Baker v. United States Steel Corp., 492 F.2d 1074 (2d Cir. 1974), the court
rejected the "need" that access would provide plaintiff with leads and aid in general discov-
ery, a rationale the district court had referred to as the "slight need test." Judge Lumbard,
while dissenting on another ground, agreed with the court and said, "[Wihile the
'particularized need' test of Pittsburgh Plate Glass. . . and . . . Proctor & Gamble. . . has
been eroded to some extent, no previous decision of this court has endorsed a standard which
would permit the breach of grand jury secrecy merely for general discovery purposes." Id. at
1080 (Lumbard, J., dissenting). See also ABC Great Stores, Inc. v. Globe Ticket Co., 309 F.
Supp. 181, 183 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (" [Tihe law requires that before the veil of grand jury secrecy
may be lifted, the party seeking disclosure must demonstrate a more compelling and particu-
larized need than merely expediting civil discovery."). See also Minnesota v. United States
Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559 (D. Minn. 1968).
In addition, the fact that the defendant has obtained his transcript or that of an employee
is not, by itself, a sufficient particularized need. Texas v. United States Steel Corp., 546 F.2d
626 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 889 (1977).
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need, even if the need is not tremendously "compelling" in the
Proctor & Gamble sense, and also emphasize action a judge might
take to reduce risks associated with disclosure. Perhaps the kernel
of this reasoning flows from United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 39 where the Court said, in a somewhat different context,37 that
"after the grand jury's functions are ended, disclosure is wholly
proper where the ends of justice require it.'' 8
U.S. Industries, Inc. v. United States District Court,399 which was
decided before Dennis,100 exemplifies the more flexible approach.
There the question was whether the plaintiffs in a civil case should
have been given access to a government sentencing recommendation
memo, which contained grand jury material and had been used in
the prior criminal case. The defendants had inspected the memo,
but it appeared that the plaintiffs put forth no particular compel-
ling need, such as that the document was needed for impeachment,
to refresh a recollection or to test credibility. 0' The court agreed
with defendant that a particularized and compelling need should be
shown"" but emphasized that the necessary degree of need would
vary, depending on the need for secrecy:
[I]n making a determination of when to permit a disclosure of grand
jury proceedings, we are to examine, not only the need of the party
seeking disclosure, but also the policy considerations for grand jury
secrecy as they apply to the request for disclosure . . . .In other
words, if the reasons for maintaining secrecy do not apply at all in a
given situation, or apply to only an insignificant degree, the party
396. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
397. The specific question about grand jury transcript access in Socony involved whether
the defendants in a criminal antitrust case should have been able to use the transcript at trial.
Thus, the question was more akin to that presented in Pittsburgh Plate Glass, see text
accompanying notes 383-89 supra, than to that presented by post-indictment civil damage
actions.
398. 310 U.S. at 234. This is not to say that judges in cases withholding grand jury materi-
als were oblivious to this admonition. For example, the court in Texas v. United States Steel
Corp., 546 F.2d 626 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 889 (1977), see note 395 supra, recognized
that some policies underlying grand jury secrecy melted after indictment. It is fair to say,
however, that cases discussed in the text accompanying notes 399-403 infra, were more sensi-
tive to determining specific conditions under which disclosure was, or could be made, proper.
399. 345 F.2d 18 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965).
400. See text accompanying notes 390-91 supra.
401. See text accompanying note 382 supra.
402. 345 F.2d at 21.
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seeking disclosure should not be required to demonstrate a large com-
pelling need.10
Because the criminal matter had been completed, the court found
that the only secrecy policy factor which existed was that of
"insuring untrammeled disclosure by future grand jury wit-
nesses."4 4 While plaintiff argued that this retaliation rationale was
negated because the corporate defendants had examined the docu-
ment, the defendant argued that retaliation could come from else-
where. The court recognized, as had the Supreme Court in Proctor
& Gamble, that the corporate employer, indeed, was not the only
source of retaliation but concluded that the district court could
delete the names of witnesses or take other action that would uphold
the grand jury secrecy policy involved and, at the same time, pro-
vide the plaintiff with much helpful information."'
A similar approach was taken in Illinois v. Sarbaugh,105 where, in
a treble damage action, Illinois requested transcripts which had
previously been furnished to defendants in the prior criminal action
under Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(A). The court recognized that the
level of need diminishes as the reasons for secrecy diminish and that
the only secrecy policy remaining was that of preventing retaliation.
Following U.S. Industries, 10 the court expressed concern over retal-
iation by those other than the witness' employer but agreed that a
protective order would obviate the problem."8 Given the lack of
strong reasons for grand jury secrecy, the court held that a sufficient
particularized need was shown where the witness whose transcript
was sought has a copy and where he or she is to testify at the civil
403. Id.
404. Id. at 22.
405. Id.
406. 552 F.2d 768 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. J.L. Simmons Co. v. Illinois, 434 U.S.
889 (1977).
407. See text accompanying notes 399-405 supra.
408. The court expressed the problem and its solution as follows:
Once the employer has the transcript, all that remains of the reason for secrecy is the
need to protect the witness, to the extent it is still possible to do so, from potential
adverse effects on his future relationships with members of the industry other than his
employer. This residual need cannot be dismissed as unworthy of any consideration,
* * * but it can be adequately dealt with by a protective order.
552 F.2d at 775.
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trial or deposition about matters discussed before the grand jury.'" 9
The Ninth Circuit's Petrol Stops decision"0 followed the same
general analysis. The court agreed that once a defendant corpora-
tion obtained the materials, the policy against disclosure due to the
possibility of retaliation lost much of its force. There was no indica-
tion, for example, that witnesses would be exposed to other sources
of retaliation. On the other hand, the court explained that "a civil
litigant may not violate [grand jury secrecy] at his pleasure. It is
not sufficient that the litigant might find it useful to do so."',, The
court was able to find what it called "a particularized need beyond
the mere relevance of the materials.""' The fact of indictment ap-
peared to contradict discovery answers which stated that the defen-
dants had not communicated about prices, the materials might be
used for impeachment. "[P]etrol Stops did not seek the materials
merely for a general fishing expedition. '41 3
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that both the trial and appel-
late courts had applied proper standards in determining whether to
grant the plaintiffs access to the grand jury materials. But the Court
reversed, holding that in some situations, where the civil action is
in a district different from that where the grand jury sat, judges in
each district must decide jointly whether to release the materials.4,
With respect to the first issue, the Court relied heavily on Proctor
& Gamble.415 It reemphasized the importance of grand jury secrecy,
the traditional reasons underlying the policy, and that a showing of
409. Id. at 777.
410. Petrol Stops Northwest v. United States, 571 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir. 1978).
411. Id. at 1129.
412. Id. at 1130.
413. Id. at 1131. It is interesting to examine how much the compelling and particularized
need standard appears to have lessened in severity between 1959 and 1978. In Pittsburgh
Plate Glass, discussed in text accompanying notes 383-89 supra, the defendant in a criminal
case could not obtain the testimony of a key government witness. In Petrol Stops, a plaintiff
in a civil case could, simply because an indictment had been handed down which appeared
to conflict with answers given in civil discovery. As discussed in text accompanying notes 429-
433 infra, some courts have held that in the context ofparens patriae litigation under section
4C of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1976), no compelling or particularized need must be
shown. This is not to argue that the more liberal cases were decided incorrectly but only to
indicate the different reasoning and philosophies of different courts at different times.
414. Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211 (1979).
415. See text accompanying notes 375-82 supra.
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need had to be made "with particularity" so that "the secrecy of the
proceedings [may] be lifted discretely and limitedly." '6 From
Proctor & Gamble (as well as Dennis"7), the Court synthesized a
three pronged test: "Parties seeking grand jury transcripts . . .
must show [1] that the material they seek is needed to avoid a
possible injustice in another judicial proceeding, [2] that the need
for disclosure is greater than the need for continued secrecy, and
[3] that their request is structured to cover only material so
needed."418 Thus, although lesser justification must be shown as the
reasons for secrecy subside, in every case, including those where the
grand jury has been terminated, the court must balance the need
for the materials against the need for continuing secrecy." 9 Explain-
ing that "[t]he District Court made clear that the question before
it was whether a particularized need for disclosure outweighed the
interest in continued grand jury secrecy," 2 all Justices concluded
that the correct standard had been applied.
The Court next turned to the question of which court should do
the balancing. While it agreed that application for access should be
made to that court where the grand jury sat, it held. that where the
judge of that court has little knowledge about the civil suit in an-
other district, he cannot assess the need for disclosure. Thus, he can
examine only one of the two relevant factors, i.e., the necessity for
continued secrecy.421' In such a situation, the Court said that the
judge of the court where the grand jury was sitting should assess in
writing the necessity for continued secrecy and send this evaluation,
together with the grand jury materials, to the judge in charge of the
civil litigation to assess the plaintiff's need. "In this way, both the
need for continued secrecy and the need for disclosure could have
been evaluated by the courts in the best position to make the respec-
416. 441 U.S. at 221 (quoting United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683
(1958)).
417. Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966). See text accompanying notes 390-91
supra.
418. 441 U.S. at 222. The Court emphasized, as it had done in Proctor & Gamble, 356 U.S.
at 683, that the classic "particularized need" is that the material will be used to refresh
recollection, impeach or test the witness' credibility. Id. n.12.
419. Id. at 223-24.
420. Id.




The Court's action on this issue appears somewhat esoteric, espe-
cially on the facts before it. If the seeming inconsistency between
the defendants' response to discovery and the indictment and nolo
plea is a sufficient particularized need, as the Court found by up-
holding the lower court's application of legal standards to the
facts,4rs surely the grand jury judge was as competent to realize this
as the civil action judge was. More generally, the Court's opinion
can be criticized because it is not clear which judge has the final say
in whether access is granted and because the suggested procedure
is going to add additional time to litigation in situations, such as
Petrol Stops, where a formal, coordinated procedure simply is not
necessary.
While the second issue presented to the Court was one of first
impression,4 2 the first, dealing with circumstances under which
grand jury materials will be made available, is more important and
interesting. A reading of the Court's discussion without considera-
tion of the specific facts of the case, would indicate that the Court
frowns on access. The Court emphasizes the importance of secrecy,
even after the grand jury finishes its work, speaks of "occasional
need" for disclosure, relies heavily on Proctor & Gamble, cautions
against a "minimal showing of particularized need" test,4 5 and im-
plicitly agrees with other courts46 that access should not be allowed
as a "mechanism for general discovery. 4 2 Given the particularized
need advanced by defendants, however, this seemingly hard-line
approach may be a mirage.
An issue of considerable current interest, for which Petrol Stops
422. Id. at 231. While the Court argued that "such a procedure would [not] be required
in every case arising under Rule 6(e)," id. at 231, it appears probable that it will be necessary
in almost all cases where the civil action and grand jury are in different districts. For only
where two districts are not involved will "the District Court having custody. . . have depend-
able knowledge of the status of, and the needs of the parties in, the civil suit." Id.
The Chief Justice and Justices Stevens and Stewart dissented from this portion of the
decision, objecting especially to the Court's tampering in an area where judges have substan-
tial discretion. Id. at 234 (Burger, C.J., and Stevens & Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
423. See text accompanying note 420 supra.
424. See 441 U.S. at 224.
425. Id. at 224 n. 14.
426. See note 395 and accompanying text supra.
427. 441 U.S. at 229.
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offers little help, is whether section 4F(b) of the Clayton Act, which
requires the federal government to provide state attorneys general
with investigative materials,"' by itself, is a sufficient compelling
need for access. The requirement was part of Title III of the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976,29 which con-
ferred standing on state attorneys general to sue as parens patriae
on behalf of natural persons injured by antitrust violations.13 °
While an in-depth discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of
this article, it is interesting that, at present, there is a difference of
opinion among district courts. In In re Montgomery County Real
Estate Antitrust Litigation4 3' and United States v. B. F. Goodrich
Co.,"43 the courts granted disclosure to state attorneys general, sub-
ject to protective orders. In the former case, the court held that the
language of section 4F(b) and its legislative history 33 supported
disclosure. In addition, the Antitrust Division of the Department of
428. Section 4F of the Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4F, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (currently codified
at) 15 U.S.C. § 15f (1976), reads as follows:
(a) Whenever the Attorney General of the United States has brought an action
under the antitrust laws, and he has reason to believe that any State attorney general
would be entitled to bring an action under this Act based substantially on the same
alleged violation of the aptitrust laws, he shall promptly give written notification
thereof to such State attorney general.
(b) To assist a State attorney general in evaluating the notice or in bringing any
action under this Act, the Attorney General of the United States shall, upon request
by such State attorney general, make available to him, to the extent permitted by law,
any investigative files or other materials which are or may be relevant or material to
the actual or potential cause of action under this Act.
429. Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1976)).
430. Section 4C(a)(1) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(1) (1976), the heart of the
parens patriae provisions, is as follows in pertinent part:
Any attorney general of a State may bring a civil action in the name of such State,
as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons residing in such State, in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the defendant, to secure monetary
relief as provided in this section for injury sustained by such natural persons to their
property by reason of any violation of the sections 1 to 7 of this title.
431. 452 F. Supp. 54 (D. Md. 1978).
432. [1978-2] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 62,389 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 1978).
433. The court relied upon the following language from the House Report:
Whenever a State attorney general so requests, in order to evaluate the notice from
the U.S. Attorney General or in order to bring a parens patriae action, § 4F(b) requires
the U.S. Attorney General to make the Justice Department's investigative files avail-
able to the State attorneys general "to the extent permitted by law." This means that
the files are to be made available except where specifically prohibited.
H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1975).
CONSISTENCY AND PREDICTABILITY
Justice supports disclosure after its criminal proceedings are com-
pleted.34 On the other hand, in In re Grand Jury which Presented
Indictments 76-149 and 77-72 (Anthracite Coal) 35 and United
States v. Colonial Chevrolet Corp., 31 the courts refused disclosure.
In the former case, the court was particularly concerned about the
effect of disclosure on future grand jury witnesses, while, in the
latter, the court expressed reluctance because of the effect on those
who had testified. Thus, the question remains unsettled.
It appears questionable that either section 4F(b) or its legislative
history support the argument that Congress intended grand jury
materials to be disclosed to states or that section 4F(b), per se,
constitutes a particularized need.437 What is not questionable is the
importance which Congress places on antitrust enforcement by the
states. This is shown not only by enactment of the parens patriae
provisions but also by the Crime Control Act of 1976,438 by which
Congress appropriated substantial funds to bolster (or in some
states, start) state antitrust programs.
Section 4F(b) indicates that Congress did not intend that states
be treated like other private plaintiffs and gives substantial cred-
ence to a theory that courts should give some special deference to
states (especially with respect to parens actions, which should be
extremely cost effective) in disclosing grand jury transcripts, even
if the only "compelling and particularized need" is that the state,
and thus its taxpayers, will save substantial time and money. On
the other hand, neither section 4F(b), its legislative history, nor
good policy dictate that courts automatically give state attorneys
434. Brief for the United States at 9, United States v. B. F. Goodrich Co. [1978-2], TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) T 62,389 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 1978), appeal docketed, No. 79-4009 (9th Cir.
1979). While, as a general rule, the Antitrust Division does not object to disclosure if its own
action is complete, it assesses each case individually to ascertain if any policies dictating
grand jury secrecy remain.
435. No. 78-176 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 1978). While this was a proprietary action by Pennsyl-
vania, rather than a parens patriae suit, the court specifically held that this difference was
immaterial.
436. No. 78-00106-N (E.D. Va. May 23, 1979). Here, the Attorney General of Virginia had
not filed a case and wanted materials to ascertain whether a parens action was warranted.
437. This seems true whether the state's civil action is a parens suit or a proprietary action.
Whether section 4F(b) applies to both or to only parens actions is unclear. Anthracite Coal,
note 372 supra, at 8.
438. Pub. L. No. 94-503, § 116, 90 Stat. 2415 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3739 (Supp. VI 1976)).
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general access to all grand jury material. Where the movant is a
state attorney general, the court should weigh this fact heavily in
its decision, and affirmatively look for ways to grant access while
paying due respect to policies underlying grand jury secrecy. In
short, the court should go out of its way to establish a procedure by
which the attorney general can obtain information that will make
its job easier.
VII. MORE ANTICOMPETITIVE STATE REGULATION: Orrin Fox Co.
Last term, in Exxon Corp. v. Maryland,4 39 the Court upheld,
against substantive due process, commerce clause and supremacy
clause challenges, a Maryland statute which (1) prohibited petro-
leum producers from owning retail gasoline stations and (2) required
producers and wholesalers of gasoline to offer all retailers in Mary-
land a voluntary allowance440 if it were offered to any.44 ' Notwith-
standing that the law might have an anticompetitive effect and thus
present "a conflict between the statute and the central policy of the
Sherman Act-our 'charter of economic liberty,' "442 the Court re-
fused to hold that the statute was preempted under the supremacy
clause by the antitrust laws. Otherwise, "if an adverse effect on
competition were, in and of itself, enough to render a state statute
invalid, the States' power to engage in economic regulation would
be effectively destroyed. '443
In commenting on this case last year, I explained that my concern
was not with the Court's result or its analysis, but rather that simi-
lar protectionist legislation in different industries is common and
that its approval by the Court would induce other groups to appear
before state legislatures to ask for economic favors.4 44 One industry
mentioned was automobile retailing, and a protective statute for
that industry was the subject of the Court's decision this term in
439. 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
440. Voluntary allowances are temporary price discounts given to retailers to allow them
to compete more effectively in a local area.
441. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 157E (Supp. 1977). The case is discusssed in Miles & Russell,
note 5 supra, at 48-55.
442. 437 U.S. at 133 (quoting Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958)).
443. 437 U.S. at 133.
444. Miles & Russell, note 5 supra, at 53.
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19791 CONSISTENCY AND PREDICTABILITY
New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co." 5 While not an anti-
trust case, Orrin Fox briefly discussed the state action exemption
and thus deserves a brief mention.
At issue was the constitutionality of a California statute which
prohibited auto manufacturers from franchising new dealerships
until a hearing could be held, if an existing, competing dealer han-
dling the same brand filed a protest with the New Motor Vehicle
Board, a California state agency. The hearing was to determine if
good cause existed for not allowing a new dealership. 46
General Motors and two dealerships challenged the constitution-
ality of the statute when the establishment of a new dealership was
445. 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
446. CAL. VEH. CODE § 3062 (West Supp. 1978). The statute, in pertinent part, is as follows:
In the event that a franchisor seeks to enter into a franchise establishing an additional
motor vehicle dealership or relocating an existing motor vehicle dealership within or
into a relevant market area where the same line-make is then represented, the franchi-
sor shall in writing first notify the Board and each franchisee in such line-make in the
relevant market area of his intention to establish an additional dealership or to relocate
an existing dealership within or into that market area. Within 15 days of receiving such
notice or within 15 days after the end of any appeal procedure provided by the franchi-
sor, any such franchisee may file with the board a protest to the establishing or relocat-
ing of the dealership. When such a protest is filed, the board shall inform the franchisor
that a timely protest has been filed, that a hearing is required pursuant to Section
3066, and that the franchisor shall not establish or relocate the proposed dealership
until the board has held a hearing as provided in Section 3066, nor thereafter, if the
board has determined that there is good cause for not permitting such dealership. In
the event of multiple protests, hearings may be consolidated to expedite the disposition
of the issue.
CAL. VEH. CODE § 3063 (West Supp. 1978) establishes factors to be considered in determining
whether good cause exists:
In determining whether good cause has been established for not entering into or
relocating an additional franchise for the same line-make, the board shall take into
consideration the existing circumstances, including, but not limited to:
(1) Permanency of the investment.
(2) Effect on the retail motor vehicle business and the consuming public in the
relevant market area.
(3) Whether it is injurious to the public welfare for an additional franchise to be
established.
(4) Whether the franchisees of the same line-make in that relevant market area are
providing adequate competition and convenient consumer care for the motor vehicles
of the line-make in the market area which shall include the adequacy of motor vehicle
sales and service facilities, equipment, supply of vehicle parts, and qualified service
personnel.
(5) Whether the establishment of an additional franchise would increase competi-
tion and therefore be in the public interest.
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held up for some fifteen months because of the statutory proce-
dure.447 The plaintiffs claimed that the statute denied them proce-
dural due process because it allowed an effective temporary injunc-
tion to be issued, precluding establishment of the new dealership for
a time, without any hearing. In addition, they argued that the statu-
tory scheme was anticompetitive, conflicting with policies underly-
ing the Sherman Act, and thus invalid under the supremacy
clause."'
The district court, after explaining the delays in dealership estab-
lishment which flowed from the procedure and the propensity of
competitors to use the statute,449 held that the failure to provide for
some type of exercise of governmental discretion before barring es-
tablishment of the dealership denied procedural due process. 5 It
did not reach the supremacy clause issue.45 ' Mr. Justice Rehnquist,
sitting as a Circuit Justice, then granted a stay of the district court's
injunction.4"'
447. According to the district court, Orrin W. Fox Co. signed a franchise agreement with
General Motors in May of 1975. On May 22, several nearby dealers filed protests, and the
Board sent notices of protest to General Motors on May 29. In July, the Board set the matter
for hearing on August 11 and 12. Continuances granted to the protesters and arguments about
pre-hearing depositions required that the hearing be reset for September of 1976. The instant
suit was filed on April 13, 1976. In the case of a second dealer, the statute was even more
effective in barring its entry into the market because a potential lessor cancelled the dealer's
option to lease when the statutory proceedings became protracted. Orrin W. Fox Co. v. New
Motor Vehicle Board, 440 F. Supp. 436, 439-40 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
448. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2.
449. The court explained:
Little imagination is needed in order to visualize how appealing such a prospect [of
delay] might be to a competing automobile dealer, particularly, inasmuch as his
protest need not be accompanied by any showing whatever of probable success, irrepar-
able injury if his protest is not granted, or a bond or any other undertaking.
440 F. Supp. at 438-39.
450. Id. at 441. For its holding that, under the fourteenth amendment, some sort of hearing
was required before the plaintiffs could be deprived of an interest, the court relied on Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), and Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
451. 440 F. Supp. at 441.
452. New Motor Vechicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345 (Rehnquist, Circuit
Justice, 1977). He explained:
Because the case presumably will be coming to us by appeal and will therefore be
within our obligatory jurisdiction, I feel reasonably certain that four Members of the
Court will vote to note probable jurisdiction and hear the case on its merits, and I am
also of the opinion that a majority of the Court will likely reverse the judgement of
the District Court.
Id. at 1347.
1979] CONSISTENCY AND PREDICTABILITY
The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction,45 3 and the parties
briefed and argued the supremacy clause issue, as well as the due
process question. The plaintiffs urged that the interim "temporary
injunction" constituted, in effect, a horizontal market allocation
which stifled competition.'54 They compared the protest procedure
to the veto given motel franchisees by the franchisor in American
Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc.45 There, the Third Circuit
applied the per se rule to a scheme whereby the franchisor, in deter-
mining whether to grant an additional franchise in an area, allowed
already established franchisees to veto the new entrant.'56
The plaintiffs' supremacy clause argument focused on
Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,457 where the Court
had invalidated a Louisiana statute authorizing vertical price-
fixing. The plaintiffs read Schwegmann to hold that when a state
statute authorizes businesses to use the state to engage in per se
violations of the antitrust laws, the statute is preempted.45
Obviously, Exxon, where the Court had said that an anticompeti-
tive effect "in and of itself" was not sufficient to invalidate a state
statute,459 was a sizable hurdle. The plaintiffs attempted to circum-
vent it by arguing that here, unlike in Exxon, the anticompetitive
effects flowed from private action. 60 On the slightly different state
Justice Rehnquist's theory of probable reversal was grounded in his belief that automobile
franchisors have no "liberty" interest in placing dealerships wherever they want. Id. at 1348.
He did not address the plaintiffs' argument that the regulatory scheme conflicted with the
antitrust laws. Id. at 1350 n. 3.
453. New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1060 (1978).
454. Motion to Affirm of Appellees at 25-26, New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox
Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978). Plaintiffs pointed out that a private agreement to allocate territories
is per se illegal under United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
455. 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975).
456. The court explained:
By thus permitting its existing franchisees to determine whether a potential compet-
itor would be allowed to enter the Elizabeth-Newark market, [Holiday Inns] enabled
its franchisees already in the Elizabeth-Newark area to divide the market between
themselves, thus precluding further intrabrand competition. Such conduct constitutes
a horizontal market allocation that is a violation of the Sherman Act.
521 F.2d at 1242.
457. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
458. Motion to Affirm, note 454 supra, at 31.
459. See text accompanying note 443 supra.
460. The argument was couched as follows:
The Court recently noted that "an adverse effect on competition [is not], in and of
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action question,4 ' they argued that no case went so far as to sustain
the state action exemption where a state agency issues what in effect
is a temporary injunction solely at the behest of private competi-
tors.
412
The defendants, on the other hand, argued that there was no
antitrust violation because section 1 of the Sherman Act requires
concerted action, and the dealers had acted unilaterally in filing
their protests. This, by itself, they argued, differentiated the case
from American Motor Inns"3 and Schwegmann, 464 where substantive
antitrust violations were shown."' Moreover, the filing of a protest,
defendants said, was protected by the Noerr-Pennington'6s doctrine.
Finally, they argued that even if there were a violation, the state
action exemption immunized it because "the protesting dealer pos-
sesses no ability to effectuate any anticompetitive result without the
positive involvement of the state.""4 7 The regulatory scheme evi-
denced a clear state policy to substitute the judgment of the Board
for that of franchisors in determining whether a new dealership
should be allowed in the market.468
itself, enough to render a state statute invalid" by reason of a conflict with "the central
policy of the Sherman Act." Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, [437 U.S. 117, 133
(1978)1 (emphasis added). Appellees make no such contention. They contend that the
temporary injunction provisions conflict with the "central policy of the Sherman Act"
not solely because those provisions adversely affect competition, but rather because
the adverse effect on competition flows from the unsupervised use of state power by
private individuals.
Brief for Appellees at 42-43 n. 35, New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S.
96 (1978).
461. The exemption from antitrust for anticompetitive activity mandated by the state
flows from Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See generally Miles, note 4 supra, at 42-45.
462. Brief for Appellees, note 460 supra, at 48.
463. See notes 455-56 supra, and accompanying text.
464. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951). See text accompa-
nying notes 457-58 supra.
465. Reply Brief of Appellant, State of California, at 6-13, New Motor Vehicle Board v.
Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
466. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents'
Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). The Noerr-Pennington doctrine holds
generally that efforts to solicit government action, even with anticompetitive purpose and
effect, are exempt from antitrust challenge. See generally Miles, note 4 supra, at 36 n. 161.
467. Reply Brief of Appellant, State of California, note 465 supra. at 20.
468. Brief for Appellants, Northern Cal. Motor Car Dealers Ass'n and Motor Car Dealers
Ass'n of S. Cal., at 20, New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
The appellants explained that the state action exemption applies:
1979] CONSISTENCY AND PREDICTABILITY
The Supreme Court reversed the district court's procedural due
process ruling and also held that California's regulatory scheme was
not preempted by the antitrust laws." 9 With respect to the proce-
dural due process issue, a majority of the Court"" held that the
effect of a protest was not similar to an injunction or an administra-
tive order for which a hearing was required by constitutional princi-
ples.4 ' In addition, they held that the Constitution did not prohibit
California from enacting "a general scheme of business regulation
that imposed reasonable restrictions"47 2 on where and when new
franchises could be established.4 3 Finally, they made clear that
there was no constitutional impediment in California's requiring the
franchisor (or any other business) to obtain approval before estab-
lishing new dealerships. 74
where (1) private conduct is clearly authorized by a state statute, (2) that shows the
clear intent on the part of the state legislation to displace competition (and the opera-
tion of the antitrust laws) in the operation of an industry and (3) there is adequate
state supervision and final control over the permanent operation and effects of the
private conduct.
Id. at 19.
469. New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
470. Burger, C.J., and Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall & Rehnquist, JJ.
471. 439 U.S. at 105. The majority explained that the franchisor was not prohibited by the
Board from doing something it otherwise had the right to do, i.e., place dealerships where it
wished, and that the Board's notice to the franchisor upon a protest being filed, that it could
not establish the dealership until a hearing was held, did not involve the exercise of discretion
by a state official and thus was not akin to an administrative order.
472. Id. at 106.
473. Thus, the majority appeared to treat the issue primarily as one of substantive due
process rather than procedural due process. See, e.g., Exxon v. Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 124
(1978); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
474. 439 U.S. at 106. The majority's opinion is not a model of analytical clarity. More
straight to the point was the concurring opinion of Justices Blackmun and Powell which
concluded as follows:
For me, the appellees have demonstrated the presence of no liberty or property
interest; having none, they have no claim to procedural safeguards; and their claim to
be free from state economic regulation is foreclosed by the substantive due process
cases. Perhaps this is what the Court is saying in its opinion. I am, however, somewhat
unsure of that.
Id. at 114 (Blackmun & Powell, JJ., concurring) (emphasis added).
Mr. Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that some action by the state was required for
constitutionality because "[tihere is no blinking the fact that the California statute gives
private parties, serving their own private advantage, the unfettered ability to invoke the
power of the State to restrain the liberty and impair the contractual arrangements of their
new competitors." Id. at 127 (Stevens J., dissenting).
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The entire Court had no difficulty in quickly disposing of the
argument that the antitrust laws preempted the California statute;
only five short paragraphs were necessary. 75 First, it held that the
general regulatory scheme was protected by the state action exemp-
tion because it is "[1] a system of regulation, [2] clearly articu-
lated and [3] affirmatively expressed, [4] designed to displace
unfettered business freedom in the matter of the establishment and
relocation of automobile dealerships.""47 Second, that part of the
scheme which allowed existing dealers to unilaterally delay a new
dealership resulted in only a short delay. Third, the case was not
akin to Schwegmann7 because there the state authorized private
conduct which violated the antitrust laws. Under the California
scheme, public conduct was authorized, i.e., filing a protest with the
state, and such conduct did not violate the antitrust laws because,
even if otherwise violative, such action was protected by the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine.47 8 Finally, the Court reiterated and approved
its language and holding in Exxon that a state statute is not
preempted by the antitrust laws just because it is anticompetitive.47
Three points should be made about the Court's supremacy clause
holding. First, it adds nothing new to the law. As should be obvious
by now, this portion of the case is on all fours with Exxon and
reemphasizes that the Court is not going to let a substantive due
process case come through the back door dressed in antitrust garb.
Second, while the state action exemption, per se, has shrunk consid-
erably in recent years,480 the Court draws the line at clearly articu-
lated and pervasive statutory schemes such as those here and in
Exxon. And finally, the regulatory program here is not nearly so
anticompetitive as that in Exxon, which removed a whole class of
475. 439 U.S. at 109-11. While Justice Stevens dissented on the due process question, on
this issue he stated that "[uInquestionably, as the Court holds, the mere fact that statutory
rules inhibit competition is not a reason for invalidating them." Id. at 116 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted).
476. Id. at 109.
'477. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951). See notes 457-58
supra, and accompanying text.
478. See note 466 supra.
479. See text accompanying note 443 supra.
480. See generally City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978);




companies from the retail gasoline market and mandated a degree
of price uniformity. 81 The fight here was not about the regulatory
system as a whole but rather about a relatively short interim time
period. Indeed, only about one percent of the protests were ulti-
mately successful.4
8
Thus, it appears that California's dealership scheme will not sig-
nificantly affect competition. We will be fortunate, however, if the
same holds true of similar economic regulatory statutes "which
merely confer[] a special benefit on a limited group of private
persons." 4
VIII. CONCLUSION
If one measures the importance of the Court's term by the signifi-
cance of any one of its decisions, this term was not particularly
interesting. Rather, as mentioned before, the term's importance was
in showing that the Court is following consistent and predictable
patterns: exemptions are construed narrowly, anticompetitive state
regulatory schemes are upheld if specifically mandated and part of
a well-defined regulatory scheme, "standing" is conferred liberally,
and perhaps most importantly, a careful weighing of anticompeti-
tive and procompetitive effects is necessary before a practice's legal-
ity can be determined. Accordingly, while the decisions themselves
may not be particularly stimulating, counsel will be able to give
better guidance in these areas, easing the burden of both their
clients and government prosecutors.
481. See text accompanying notes 439-41 supra.
482. 439 U.S. at 121 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
483. Id. at 120.
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